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relatively little attention or analysis. That is the organization of the U.S. 

 Government for policymaking and funding of international cooperation in 

 science and technology. In fact, the particular structure of the U.S. 

 Government and the Government's budgetary process have a great deal to do with 

 the difficulty of expanding such programs even under supportive 

 Administrations, and much to do with the ease of cutting them back in 

 antagonistic or disinterested Administrations. The lack of clear 

 understanding of this aspect of the subject, though by no means the only 

 critical element, nevertheless can frustrate efforts to build international 

 cooperation even when the political will exists to do so. And it certainly 

 goes a long way to explain why more projects and possibilities for 

 international cooperation do not arise spontaneously, whatever the interest of 

 a particular Administration. 



Astonishing as it may be, the U.S. Government has no clear governmental 

 instrument for international cooperation, and most agencies are restricted to 

 using appropriated funds only for "domestic" R&D objectives. Individual 

 departments and agencies must carry out their own programs of cooperation as 

 part of regular budgets, with little or no recognition of the problems ana 

 disincentives to cooperation thus created. Difficult as it is for cooperation 

 on projects of clear scientific merit and interest, proposals with mixed 

 scientific and political objectives have no natural home or funding resource. 



There are many different categories of cooperative programs that need to 

 be considered, for each has rather different issues associated with it. There 

 are, for example, those programs of high scientific quality that contribute to 

 scientific objectives of an American domestic agency; or there are those of 

 primary value to developing countries; or those with political overtones, or 

 others. I discuss all categories in material I am submitting for the record, 

 but will mention here only two: that category of programs that woula be of 

 high scientific quality and high interest to a government agency if carried 

 out; and, second, the category of programs with mixed scientific and political 

 objectives, such as those with the Soviet Union. (My remarks are not meant to 

 include very large international cooperative projects or programs, such as a 

 major high energy accelerator, because those proposals tend to be considered 

 as unique proposals outside the typical policy process. Some of the same 

 considerations will apply, however.) 



Cooperative projects of high scientific quality and agency interest 



In principle, one would expect few problems with proposed programs of 

 cooperation that are of high quality and would contribute to the scientific 

 objectives of an American government agency. Presumably, the programs could 

 compete in "routine" fashion for funds within agency budgets and objectives, 

 with relatively clear criteria of choice. 



In practice, there are significant problems that serve to create major 

 disincentives to develop such projects or to carry them through to 

 implementation. These have to do with the dominant domestic perspective of 

 U.S. scientific agencies, and corresponding lack of international interest, 

 and the detailed processes by which projects are proposed and funded. 



