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Thus, iopedinents and disincentives, even for projects entirely justified 

 scientifically, can be substantial. They arise from the general domestic 

 orientation of the U.S. Government, and a policy and funaing process that 

 provides little recognition of the special requirements for organizing and 

 implementing international cooperative projects. Not all possible 

 international projects shoul d be supported, of course, but the growing 

 importance of such cooperation to the U.S., as well as to others, dictates 

 greater efforts to modify the existing climate, and to make the governmental 

 process more flexible and responsive. 



Cooperative projects with mixed scientific and political objectives 



The considerations above apply to programs with dominant scientific 

 interest. How much more difficult it is for those with important political 

 objectives that may be good science, but are not likely to be coupetititve 

 within agencies, nor able to be put through a grant approval process even if 

 they were. In effect, these programs attempt to "use" science for political 

 purposes, often a controversial concept on its own. The bilateral 

 U.S./U.S.S.R. programs obviously are prime examples, though there are others, 

 and in my view should be many more. 



The question here is not whether , but jiow to use science and technology 

 in support of the nation's foreign policy interests. International activities 

 in science and technology can serve a variety of objectives in addition to k&U 

 goals, including contributing to U.S. political and economic interests with 

 other countries, attracting high level attention to particular issues, 

 creating advantages for American industry in foreign countries, gaining 

 knowledge of scientific and technological progress in other countries, and 

 stimulating work on common or global problems. Presidents, Secretaries of 

 State, and others have capitalized on the nation's strength in science and 

 technology for cooperation designed to achieve more than scientific purposes 

 and will continue to want to do so. That is appropriate, for national goals 

 can be served by sensible use of all resources, as long as it is done 

 responsibly and without damage to the primary mission of those resources. 



The question is how to carry out such programs responsibly, from both 

 scientific and political perspectives. Sadly (ana surprisingly), the U.S. 

 Government has no adequate mechanism for dealing with programs with these 

 kinds of mixed motives. Individual departments and agencies have no, or 

 extremely limited, formal means to fund programs that cannot be fully 

 justified on scientific and mission criteria, nor have they the capability to 

 interpret foreign policy objectives in order to design and choose projects. 

 The Department of State has also neither the funds nor the capacity to 

 initiate and manage worthwhile scientific programs on its own. 



Interagency mechanisms are often used as a way to plan such mixed-purpose 

 programs or to secure funds for them from regular budgets, but that is a 

 cumbersome mechanism at best, necessarily can be used sparingly only for 

 programs of overriding political interest, is not calculated to provide 

 efficient program management and oversight, and at tines may lead to rather 

 improper or inappropriate use of regular budget funds. Moreover, it certainly 



