347 



But I believe in the end the site choice was correct to go to Britain, 

 because when you consider the situation at that time, Great Brit- 

 ain had joined the European Community somewhat late, only in 

 1975. It was one of the large member states and it was not the site 

 of any European installation organization whatsoever. I think in 

 the end, the strong wish of the then-British Government to have a 

 European installation in the country is a sign that Britain, not 

 only by signature under treaty but also by real activities, belonged 

 to the Community, was the reason which had to be accepted also 

 by the competitors. 



The only regrettable thing was the loss of 2 years. But you have 

 to look at this, I think, in the end in a general context, and then 

 you will find in hindsight that whatever the details of the decision 

 were, it makes political sense. Otherwise, it would not have ap- 

 peared. How you prepare better in the future things — well, there 

 is, of course, always a solution of having two, which is the easiest 

 way out of such situations or discuss this in a hard boiled but nev- 

 ertheless friendly manner. 



After all, if you have the common aim we want to do it, you will 

 find a way how to give in to reason. 



Mr. FuQUA. There is always hope. 



Dr. WusTER. Oh, yes. Otherwise we wouldn't be in business. 



Mr. FuQUA. Getting back to the fusion program, how do you feel 

 about the U.S. program for the low-ignition device? 



Dr. WusTER. Well, I think one has to see here that the general 

 problem situation between the U.S. program and the European To- 

 kamak Program — I wouldn't mention the fact you have a second 

 line and we have two smaller alternative lines. 



Let's concentrate on the strategies for awhile. The program strat- 

 egy is different because you have a front-line device, and ours are 

 somewhat different in aim and scope. For historical reasons, the 

 scope of the JET experiment goes somewhat further, hopefully very 

 close, to ignition conditions, somewhat further than the TFTR. The 

 European program strategies at the moment in its perspective, 

 therefore not foreseen, a physics only in — physics device as a step 

 in the program. Our program strategy is at the moment JET, the 

 next stage, which we call the NET — not too much fantasy on 

 that — the next would be a technology experiment, the next stage 

 after that is demo. But this is a program strategy which is all the 

 time under review, because it would be nonsensical to maintain 

 such a strategy if nature should show that its laws are not allowing 

 such a big step. It is a bigger step than is foreseen at the moment 

 in the U.S. program. That it comes up in the U.S. program earlier 

 than with us is, I believe, mainly based on the fact that our col- 

 leagues probably see also that JET may push somewhat further in 

 that direction than the TFTR. 



To be frank, gentlemen, if I had the money I would do both, first 

 the physics and then the technology experiment. 



Mr. FuQUA. But it would be a compatible program and a joint 

 effort? 



Dr. WusTER. Well, if we could only agree to it, I would welcome 

 it very much because I think in that way we could by combining 

 these two things make things at the same time more probable to 

 succeed and save money for both. 



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