437 



Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space Age 1019 



race or arms control obtained. Contracts for the development of spy satellites 

 had already been let in 1956, before Sputnik I, and there is evidence that concern 

 for the establishment of the legality of satellite overflight (or "freedom of space") 

 figured in Eisenhowrer's insistence on the civilian Vanguard satellite program 

 and increased risk of losing the satellite "race."^" A Soviet strategic capability 

 made an American push for a sophisticated and invulnerable surveillance 

 technique — that is, unlike the U-2 — inevitable. Second, an ICBM force adequate 

 for any strategy beyond the crudest "city-busting" deterrent required supporting 

 satellite systems for geodesy, meteorology, targeting, infrared early warning, 

 electronic ferreting, and surveillance.^' The Soviet Union rebuffed American 

 demarches for control of missile and space technology with their habitual 

 demands for removal of foreign bases and "general and complete disarmament" 

 without inspection, while the United States carefully promoted a ban on 

 "aggressive" rather than "military" uses of space, in order to shelter its own 

 military satellites. Thus, while the only objects in orbit — Sputniks, Explorers, and 

 Vanguards — were still contributions to the International Geophysical Year, and 

 hopeful globalisis cried "Space for Peace," the militarization of space proceeded 

 apace.^^ 



The Soviets were as surprised as anyone by the impact of their Sputniks and 

 Luniks. Their propaganda value contributed to great changes in the Soviet 

 Union, including another jolt upward in research and development expendi- 

 tures. Nikita Khrushchev initiated his own "New Look" defense policy by sacking 

 the traditionalist war hero Marshal G. K. Zhukov just after Sputnik I and giving 

 priority to the new strategic rocket forces."^ In the United States, the "missile 

 gap" furor helped elect John Kennedy to the presidency and kicked off an arms 

 build-up on the American side (especially the thousand Minuteman ICBMs and 



™ Donald Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in Cabinet Minutes. October 18, 1957, Eisenhower 

 Library; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The WhiU House Years, volume 2: Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (New York. 

 1965), 210. 



These simple facts about the passive militarization of space escaped the understanding of most journalists, 

 politicians, and citizens for years. I found the most succinct early statement of the complementarity of long- 

 range missiles and military satellite systems in Colonel Petkovsek's "LUtilisation militaire des engins spatiaux," 

 Revw mdilaire generate (]\j\y 1961), following the ideas of General Pierre GauUois. Unlike American leaders, de 

 Gaulle felt it advantageous to popularize, not downplay, the military space effort. 



" American policy for outer space, including tactics for international legal protection of military satellites, 

 was codified in NSC 5841/1, "Preliminary L'S Policy on Outer Space," August 18, 1958, and NSC 5918, "US 

 Policy on Outer Space," December 17, 1959. On the politics of "spy satellites," see Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 

 Legitimization of Reconnaisance Satellites: An Example of Informal Arms Control" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 

 University, 1981); and see Philip Klass, Secret Sentries m Space (New York. 1971). John Taylor and David 

 Monday's Spies m the Sky (New York. 1973) only concerns air-breathing spy planes. Surveys of miliury space 

 developments include Eldon W. Downs. The U.S. Air Force in Space (New York. 1966); Michael N. Golovine, 

 Conflict m Space: A Pattern of War in a New Dimension {London, 1962); Robert Salkeld, War and Space {Engleviood 

 Cliffs, N.J., 1970); and Bhupcndra M. jd^anu Space— Battlefield of tlie Future? (Stockholm, 1978). Military space 

 systems can only increase in importance as the United States and Soviet Union move toward operational 

 antisatellite weapons and possibly space-based lasers. 



" See Herben S. Dinerstein, War and the Souiel Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Rei'ohUion in Soi'iet Military and 

 Political Thinking (New York, 1962); Marshal Sokolovskii et ai, Soviet Military Strategy ("Voennaia Strategiia"), 

 Rand R-4 16-PR (1963); Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967); and The 

 Impact of Technology on the Soviet Military: A Challenge to Traditional Military Professionalism, Rand RM-4 198-PR 

 (1964). On early debate over the military uses of space, see Herbert L. Sawyer, "The Soviet Space Controversy. 

 1961 to 1963" (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1969). 



