442 



1024 Walter A. McDougall 



role of the President's Science Advisory Committee in the organization of the 

 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has also been subject to 

 historical treatment.^^ It was in these years when the ideal of "good government" 

 informed by "good science" seems to have been best approximated, at least 

 according to the memoirs of the first two presidential science advisors, James 

 Killian and George Kistiakowsky.'"' Leaning on his scientists for support in the 

 effort to quell overreaction to Sputnik, Eisenhower oversaw the establishment of a 

 space policy that emphasized science and defense as opposed to engineering 

 showmanship and prestige. But he had to struggle against military and congres- 

 sional leaders, the aerospace industry, and the press, all of whom exaggerated 

 Soviet capabilities to justify ever greater budgets for research and development. 

 Despite his affection for "my scientists," who were "one of the few groups ... in 

 Washington who seemed to be there to help the country and not help themselves,"" 

 Eisenhower left office fearful of the impact that a headlong technological race with 

 the Soviets would have on American society. He warned against the acquisition of 

 undue power and influence not only by the "military-industrial complex" but also 

 by a "scientific-technological elite." 



By the late- 1960s, critics of American policies in technology and defense recalled 

 that "Ike tried to warn us." It marked the advent of an Eisenhower revisionism that 

 is still cresting. But a close reading of the Farewell Address reveals that Eisenhower 

 saw the trends he deplored as inevitable, and that he had no remedy for them. In 

 the late 1950s, he had already encountered the quandary of sharply conflicting 

 scientific advice, as well as the need to overrule even unanimous scientific advice for 

 political reasons. Scientists solidly opposed expensive space missions for prestige 

 purposes, especially manned spaceflight. Yet Eisenhower transferred the manned 

 space mission and the Von Braun rocket team to NASA and personally ordered 

 accelerated development of the giant Saturn booster, for which no military or 

 scientific mission existed. Although he backed scientific opposition to the proposed 

 Apollo moon program, it was the cost that appalled him. He had reluctantly 

 granted the need to compete for reasons of prestige. 



Eisenhower's fears were confirmed under the succeeding administrations, but 

 not perhaps in the way he expected. In the 1960s, science and technology 

 penetrated numerous corners of government, while enthusiasm spread for techno- 

 logical fixes abroad (whether in military spending or developmental aid) and social 

 engineering at home. Yet the influence of the scientists themselves faded. Why 

 should the progressive and even technocratic administrations of Kennedy and 

 Johnson have reduced the influence of scientific advisors even as they heavily 

 subsidized the research community? Even NASA ceased to be an agency shaped 



Saerwe and Government (New York, I97I); Ralph E. Lapp. Ttw New Priesthood (New York, 1965): and Don K. 

 Price, The Scientific EslaU (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 



" See Richard Hirsch and Joseph Trento, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (New York, 1973); 

 Arthur L. Levine, The Fulure of the U.S. Space Program (New York, 1975); and Robert L. Rosholl, The 

 Administrative History of the NASA. 1958-1963 (Washington, 1966). 



Killian'sS/mmiAs. Scientists, and Eisenhower is a memoir of great value. George Kistiakowskv'sA Scientulatlhe 

 White House is a diary graced by a long, excellent historical introduction by Charles S. Maier. 



■" Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 241. 



