475 



Sl>arr-Agi' Europe 189 



missile, headed for cancellation before flight testing, could survive as 

 the first stage of an all-European satellite launcher. Price also foresaw 

 coordinated space research in firms and laboratories across Europe; 

 manufacture of components and whole spacecraft in European plants; 

 Joint launch facilities; communications and other conmiercial satellites; 

 nuclear and solar power for spacecraft; hypersonic, reusable winged 

 vehicles; space medicine; and even nuclear, ion, or plasma "sjDace 

 drives." None of this was fantastic, he insisted. The Common Market 

 states plus Britain, Norway, and Switzerland had combined gross 

 national products greater than the Soviet and over half the American. 

 Without the burden of military or manned programs, Europe could 

 surely compete in selected technologies of scientific and economic 

 potential.'^ 



Price's assumptions met a willing audience in a Europe searching for 

 its place in the postwar, postimperial world. It seemed the old conti- 

 nent, the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, must decay by the 21st 

 century into a global backwater unless shejoined the new technological 

 revolution. By 1959 both British political parties were sponsoring bills 

 for a ministry of science or technology, Gaullist France was embarked 

 on an R&D boom, and the West Germans were eager to master ancil- 

 lary space technologies (despite a shyness about missilery stemming 

 from the V-2 heritage). So the Council of Europe and a committee 

 of experts at Strasbourg in I960 endorsed the principle of a Euro- 

 pean space program. When Minister of Aviation Peter Thorneycroft 

 offered the Blue Streak to Europe the following year, the European 

 Launch Development Organization (ELDO) was born. Britain would 

 perfect the Blue Streak, France would provide a second stage called 

 Coralie, Germany the Astris third stage, Italy the test satellite, the 

 Netherlands the telemetry, Belgium the guidance station, and Austra- 

 lia its test site at Woomera in the outback. 



Here was an enterprise in multinational technological cooperation 

 on an unprecedented scale, and a mission for Europe — space-age 

 Europe. In the initial enthusiasm, potential difficulties were brushed 

 aside or unappreciated. While ELDO-financed research was to be 

 shared openly, the French insisted that memi)ers not be requited to 

 share data acquired in national research. The French also insisted that 

 no restrictions be pla(ed on national military application of ELDO- 

 derived technology, thus killing chances of American aid. The big 

 states insisted that voting power in ELDO reflect contributions, the 

 smaller states feared being pawns. So the convention required that the 



""European C.ooperation in Space," Spac efiight, ]an\\z\y 1961; David Price, Politiral 

 and Fcononiic Factors Relating to European Space Cooperation," Spaceflight, January 

 l")()2: Kenneth Owen, "Europe's Future in Space," Flight, ]\.i\\ 6, IWl. 



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