477 



Spa ce-A ge Eu rope 1 9 1 



ogy alone. European aerospace firms, the most enthusiastic but also the 

 most discerning of observers, understood better than the politicians 

 tlie cost and frustrations of large-scale R&D. Hawker-Siddeley and 

 SEREB accordingly gathered about them an industrial lobby of 

 ninety-nine companies called EUROSPACE to educate and influence 

 the bureaucrats. Almost half the member firms were French, as were 

 the president, Jean Delorme, and secretary-general, Yves Demerliac. 

 In the words of the former, "Unless the European countries wish to 

 join the ranks of the backward and underdeveloped countries within 

 the next fifty years, they must take immediate steps to enter these new 

 fields." A low-orbit launcher, scientific satellites, and half a billion 

 dollars did not suffice for what Delorme called "a matter of survival."'^ 



How so? Space technology scarcely promised big profits in the near 

 future — the motives for the superpowers were defense and prestige. 

 Even communications satellites, which held immediate promise, were 

 hardly "a matter of survival." But EUROSPACE took a larger view that 

 might be termed Euro-Gaullism. It advised against importing U.S. 

 systems, even if permitted to do so, in order that Europeans might gain 

 experience in R&D. The payoff was in the means, not just the ends. 

 "European industry," recalled Demerliac, "never considered space as a 

 money-making activity. [Its] main initial motive was to improve its 

 technology so as to remain competitive in world markets. Space was a 

 means of forming or retaining qualified teams capable of delivering 

 advanced items of equipment and also — perhaps above all — to manage 

 the joint development of complex systems or sub-systems. . . . The 

 target for European industry is clearly to acquire prime contractor 

 ability for all space applications systems."" 



"Prime contractor ability for all space applications"! Even as the 

 French hoped to target specific markets and achieve technological 

 primacy within Europe, so the European aerospace industry as a whole 

 sought competitiveness in targeted world space markets. The impact of 



'*SEREB and Hawker-Siddeley Aviation, L'Industne et I'espace (Paris and London, 

 1961); Jean Delorme in EUROSPACE, Pro/>o5a/j /ora£uro/?mn S/^acf Program (Fontenay- 

 s-bois, 1963). pp. 11-13, 9&-97. 



"Yves Demerliac, "European Industrial Views on NASA's Plans for the 70s," AAS 

 Goddard Memorial Symposium (Washington. D.C., March 197 1 ). See also the testimony 

 of Eilene Galloway, congressional staff expert on space policy, after interviews with 

 European officials in April 1967: Library of Congress. Clinton Anderson Papers. Box 

 919. EUROSPACE also proposed an ambitious program of space R&D including a 

 reusable "space transporter" or "shuttle." See EUROSPACE. Proposals for a European 

 Space Program, pp. 1 7-67, and Aerospace Transporter (Fontenay-s-bois. 1964). The preface 

 to the latter was written by an aging Eugen Sanger, (ierman rocket engineer who 

 designed a reusable "boost-glide" space vehicle during World War II and can be consid- 

 ered the progenitor of the Space Shuttle. 



