478 



192 Walter A. McDougall 



such technological strategies on trans-Atlantic cooperation was pro- 

 found. NASA was eager to cooperate in space science; the United 

 States might, in its generous moods, even welcome Europeans as 

 subcontractors in expensive missions. But it was not likely to transfer 

 technology sufficient to create full-sfcale competition for American 

 aerospace firms. NASA was forthcoming with proposals to train for- 

 eign scientists and lainich scientilic payloads on a reimbursable basis. 

 But the State Department tried to discourage the Europeans from 

 forming ELDO and turned a cold shoulder when the Emopeans 

 sought help for their Europa-1 booster. De Gaulle insisted, and Euro- 

 peans listened, that the day might come when American willingness 

 even to launch foreign satellites might cease. Europe must have her 

 own space booster.'** 



Nevertheless, the EUROSPACE plea for an additional £218 million 

 for space failed to persuade European parliaments committed to 

 expanding social welfare in the 1960s. So ELDO and ESRO, under- 

 funded and poorly conceived, came to exemplify all the risks of multi- 

 lateral R&D. First, the governments delayed ratification of the conven- 

 tions until 1964, by which time the Americans and Soviets had pulled 

 much further ahead. Then the brick and mortar work of building the 

 centers, especially for ESRO, absorbed several more years, while most 

 of the first triennial budget went for overhead. Not until 1967 did the 

 first experimental satellite ESRO-1 reach orbit, courtesy of NASA. 



The ESRO members also quarreled over disproportionate distribu- 

 tion of contracts, the issue of juste retour. National responsibilities in 

 ESRO projects were not fixed in advance, so contracts flowed to the 

 most competitive firms. France, true to her intent, garnered a per- 

 centage of contracts up to twice the level of her contribution. Efficiency 

 demanded that business go to the most qualified firms, but politics 

 demanded "affirmative action" for countries playing "technological 

 catch-up." Either the poor subsidized the rich, or the rich subsidized 

 mediocrity in the short run and new competition in the long run. Even 

 as the French deplored American dominance vis-a-vis Europe, they 

 themselves exploited a dominant position within Europe. 



Yet American progress obliged Europeans to press on, despite their 

 growing organizational troubles. In 1962 the U.S. Congress passed the 

 Communications Satellite Act. The following year NASA launched 

 Syncom 1, the world's first geosynchronous communications satellite, 



'"A. V. Cleaver, "European Space Activities since the War: A Personal View," British 

 Interplanetary Society Paper (March 1974). 1 he United Slates cooperated heartily with 

 ESRO, including providing a tracking station in Alaska. When ESRO turned increasingly 

 to commercial applications of space technology at the end of the HXiOs, liowever, 

 American enthusiasm cooled. 



