483 



Spa ft' -Age Europe 197 



In December 1972, after five vears of iiiicertaitity about its own and 

 America's future plans in space, the F.urojjean Space CA)uncil adopted 

 the above recommendations and proclaimed a new Kuropean Space 

 .\gencv (ESA). It absorbed ELDO and ESRO and promised common, 

 coordinated, long-term space and industrial policies. ESA grew out of 

 the failures of the 1960s but also from the changed setting of the 1970s. 

 I)e (iaulle was gone, Britain was in the Clommon Market, dvnamic 

 (.ermany took up the slack left by Britain and Italv, the United States- 

 Soviet space race seemed over, and all nations were turning attention 

 to the "practical" benefits of spaceflight. Last but not least was the U.S. 

 s[)ace program for the 1970s. The Sj)ace Shuttle, approved by Nixon in 

 1972, promised to inaugurate a new era of loutine, inex|)ensi\e oi bital 

 (light and yet offered the Europeans an intriguing target of commer- 

 cial op|)ortunity. For the Shuttle, a low-orbit workhorse, would not 

 markedly improve American capability to launch payloads into high 

 orbits. The Europeans had not only a political impet ati\e but a tec hni- 

 cal opportunity to press on with devel<)})ment of a con\entional heavy 

 booster. 



The ESA rested on a grand compromise. The other Europeans 

 granted a renewed drive for the independent launch capacity de- 

 manded by France on the condition that France assume management 

 and provide the bulk of funding. Second, ESA acceded to Germany's 

 wish for a major cooperative program with the United States on condi- 

 tion that the Germans take charge and absorb most of the cost. I bird, 

 the British won approval for their pet project, a marine comsat, on the 

 condition that they take the lead. The first piogram was the L3S 

 launcher, soon to be dubbed Ariane, and 70 percent French; the 

 second was Spacelab, made to fly inside the U.S. Shuttle cargo bav, and 

 53 percent German; the third, Marecs, was 56 percent British. Sujjport 

 of research centers and administration inherited from P^SRO re- 

 mained common responsibilities. But "big R&D" was now a mixture, 

 not a solution, of national inputs; ESA won the k^yalty of member states 

 only through a partial nationalization of its international program. 

 Gaullism and Euro-Gaullism coexisted, and the current era of neomer- 

 cantilist competition in space was born.'' 



=f: * * 



Emope has not escaped all the difficulties of nmltinational R&D. 

 Member parliaments still have an aversion to long-range plaiuiing and 



■'Oil the liaiisitioii lo KSA, sec; KSA, Sfxiri' — I'ail of i:utoj)r\ i.uvtuiiniinit (I'.iiis. Ml7'.l) 

 .111(1 F.uJof)r\ riacf ni Sfxirf (I'.iris. lOHl); U.S. CoiiKi fss, ^V,„U U /.//■ Sfuur l'in^,,»in. 

 1>|, L'H5-:nt. 



