485 



Space-Age Europe 199 



fer orbit, a highly eccentric path that reaches apogee at the required 

 22,000 miles above the earth. The final apogee motor that nudges the 

 satellite into a circular orbit at that height is the responsibility of the 

 customer. An upgraded Ariane-4 with a payload of over 9,000 pounds 

 is approved and scheduled for operation by 1990.^' 



Now let us compare Ariane to the Shuttle, the only surviving project 

 in a post-Apollo plan that originally included a space station, a lunar 

 base, and even a manned voyage to Mars. Even to win approval of the 

 Shuttle, NASA had to cut its initial cost estimates in half. Budgetary, 

 technical, and military constraints, as well as the "fully reusable" fea- 

 ture, all dictated concentration on low orbits. The manned capacity of 

 the Shuttle in turn meant cuts in payload and operating envelope. 

 Finally, even the fully reusable feature was compromised, and the 

 Shuttle evolved as an unlikely combination consisting of the orbiter, 

 two strap-on recoverable solid rockets, and the bulky, nonrecoverable 

 external tank." The Shuttle is a spectacular tool for low-orbit opera- 

 tions but does not significantly increase efficiency on high-orbit 

 launches. To meet the needs of communications customers, the Shuttle 

 must be augmented by a perigee stage, or "inertial upper stage," 

 carried in the cargo bay and released at an altitude of 120 miles. The 

 perigee stage then boosts the payload to its apogee of 22,000 miles, 

 whereupon the apogee stage connected to the satellite fires to achieve 

 the circular geostationary orbit. It is a cumbersome process: it was this 

 which French planners perceived in 1972.^" 



Even if the Shuttle-plus system proves reliable — and it too has had 

 mixed results — can it match the Ariane in price? Fhat depends entirely 

 on government policies, for state-funded high technology is a neomer- 

 cantilist controlled market, as de Gaulle sensed from the dawn of the 

 space age. NASA claimed a cost base for geosynchronous insertion of 

 $30 million, equal to that claimed for Ariane. Either competitor could 

 slash prices, even below cost, in order to capture a greater market share 

 for political purposes. But a liberal pricing policy is harder for the 

 United States: the Shuttle cost $12 billion through 1980, the Ariane 



*A. Dattner, "Reflections on Europe in Space — the First Two Decades and Be>ond," 

 ESA BR- 10 (March 1982). 



■''On the Shuttle decision, see: U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Space Science and 

 Applications, U.S. Cwilian Space Program'. I95S-I978, 97lh Cong.. 1st srss. (1981), 

 pp. 44.^)-.'S7; John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Decision: lechnoh^gic al and Toliiit al 

 Choice," maiuiscript supplied by author, l.ogsdon, the diiector of the graduate prograni 

 in Science, Tec hnology, and Public Policy at (;eorge Washington University, is complet- 

 ing a book on the decision to build the Shuttle. 



^"For an excellent summary of the current laimch-vehicle competition, see Alain 

 Dupas, Ariane et la navette spatiale (Paris, 1981). 



