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202 Walter A. McDougall 



rivals. Space technology, the very symbol of American technological 

 hegemony just a decade ago, now reflects the bitter challenge facing 

 the United States in the 1980s. 



Why did Brzezinski's expectation of a growing U.S. lead in high 

 technology prove false, especially since the nation still spends more on 

 space than the rest of the free world combined? First and foremost, it is 

 because of a nefariousdivisionof labor that places on the United States 

 almost sole responsibility for the strategic defense of the non- 

 Communist world. If one counts military interest in the Shuttle, almost 

 60 percent of American space spending goes toward military research, 

 while less and less money has been available for critical commercial 

 sectors in astronautics (and aeronautics). The military requirements 

 have an even more vexing effect — several technologies now exploited 

 by foreigners have been developed by the Pentagon but cannot be 

 transferred to the private sector for security reasons. 1 hese include 

 high-resolution remote-sensing techniques and 30/20 comsat technol- 

 ogy. United States corporations, in turn, shy away from risky markets 

 in which foreign competition is heavily subsidized by government. 



The Shuttle could still transform the space environment if vigor- 

 ously exploited. The challenge of the various "Gaullists" might be 

 transcended by a U.S. space station, space-based manufacture of drugs 

 and crystals, or communications "platforms" with functionally limitless 

 capacities, all built with modules boosted by the Shuttle. But to justify 

 such expensive enterprises politically and underwrite them with tax 

 dollars merely to maintain an image of leadership and technical vir- 

 tuosity would be to adopt a Gaullist approach on our own account, 

 while attempts to justify such a process commercially might not survive 

 limited-range cost-benefit analysis. Nor is it natural for Americans to 

 engage in centrally managed change, in "ten-year plans" dictated by 

 bureaucrats, even assuming that NASA, the Pentagon, the White 

 House, Commerce, NOAA, the aerospace industry, and Congress 

 could agree on a long-term strategy for civilian space exploitation. 

 Gaullism is not an expression of the American culture of technology. 

 These considerations help to explain why Reagan aped Kennedy, in a 

 dramatic presidential appeal, by defining a civilian space station as a 

 national goal to be achieved "within a decade," despite the opposition 

 of the Pentagon, the president's science adviser, and the Office of 

 Management and Budget. Yet we cannot know whether such a station 

 is a bold investment or a folly until decades after its completion — much 

 less its approval. 



These perplexing problems, at home and abroad, are not confined 

 to space technology. They exist in more and more sectors as state- 

 driven technological change pushes foreign governments further away 



