598 



The EC and Japanese fusion program plans have been developed in 

 detail for the next few years and resource commitments have been made 

 accordingly. Furthermore, any major collaboration must meet the 

 requirements of the separate national programs and therefore must be 

 preceeded by substantial joint planning. Thus, international 

 collaboration cannot be expected to produce any substantial annual 

 cost savings from current levels over the next few years, although 

 cumulative savings over the long run, in the sense described above, 

 may be expected. 



Broader U.S. policy considerations may be at odds with technical 

 opportunities for cooperation. The USSR has proposed joint 

 international construction of the next-step tokamak experiment, yet it 

 is unlikely that U.S. -USSR collaboration is possible in the current 

 circumstances. Japan is willing to discuss further major 

 collaboration, but in the United States there exists a political 

 sensitivity to Japan on economic grounds. On the other hand, the 

 Europeans, with whom collaboration would be the least controversial, 

 show little interest. 



These points are related to the following conclusion: 



o Large-scale international collaboration can be achieved, but 

 not quickly . 



Despite the Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act of 1980, the 

 U.S. government is perceived in some quarters as lacking a firm 

 commitment and a realistic plan to develop fusion. A clear policy 

 statement on the goals of the U.S. fusion program and a corresponding 

 plan to meet those goals not only would be helpful for evaluating 

 proposed major international cooperative projects but also would 

 improve perceptions of the U.S. commitment. By contrast, it would be 

 a mistake simply to increase emphasis on international cooperation to 

 compensate for less than a full commitment. 



The programmatic and technical decision-making process is quite 

 different in the United States, the EC, and Japan. In the United 

 States, major programmatic and technical decisions can be taken by 

 highly placed individuals or small groups, whereas in Japan such 

 decisions are taken only after lengthy review and discussion at lower 

 echelons lead to a consensus. In Europe such decisions are taken only 

 after numerous committee reviews. These styles lead to flexible, and 

 occasionally even erratic, evolution in U.S. policies and programs and 

 to deliberate, and occasionally even cumbersome, evolution in EC and 

 Japanese policies and programs. Accommodation of these different 

 styles of decision making is necessary for large-scale cooperation. 



The United States is also perceived in some quarters as an 

 "unreliable partner" based on previous experiences in space science, 

 synthetic fuels, and fusion itself. The annual funding appropriation 

 process makes it difficult for the United States to commit to 

 multiyear projects without the possibility of facing a choice later of 

 either going back on the commitment or sacrificing other elements of 



