600 



national host governments. Mechanisms must be adopted for site 

 selection, the capture of perceived commercial value, the ownership * 

 and sharing of intellectual property, and policy with respect to 

 licensing technology to nonpar ticipants. The equitable participation 

 of national industry must be accommodated, and technology transfer 

 will have to be suitably controlled in instances that affect national 

 security. Standards for safety and radiation will have to be 

 harmonized, and subtle changes in the roles and missions of 

 established domestic institutions will have to be faced. 



The foregoing points all support the following conclusion: 



o There is a host of considerations that must be resolved in 

 implementation, but these appear workable . 



OVERALL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 



Three widely separated courses seem to be open to the United States on 

 the path to fusion energy: (1) to make the commitment to become the 

 all-out competitive leader in all its aspects, (2) to engage in 

 large-scale international collaboration, or (3) to withdraw with the 

 intent of purchasing the developed technology from others in the 

 future. In actuality, the extreme first and third courses would not 

 likely be so sharply drawn. Degrees of competitiveness, ranging from 

 preeminence down to simple parity with others could be defined. 

 Degrees of withdrawal, from slight to serious forfeiture of equality 

 could be contemplated. Although the committee did not formally 

 analyze the situation in this context, it still forms a useful setting 

 for an overall conclusion, derivable from some of the individual ones 

 stated earlier: 



o For the United States at this time, large-scale international 

 collaboration is preferable to a mainly domestic program, which 

 would have to command substantial additional resources for the 

 competitive pursuit of fusion energy development or run the 

 risk of forfeiture of equality with other world programs . 



Given this overall conclusion, two major recommendations follow: 



o The first priority should be the establishment of a clear set 

 of policies and objectives and a considered program plan for 

 future U.S. fusion activities . 



Such a position is necessary as the basis for discussions with 

 potential partners and for any long-range commitments that ensue. 

 Concrete near-term and intermediate objectives and a schedule for 

 their attainment would be appropriate elements of the program plan. 



The Department of Energy should formulate the position for the review 

 and approval of the Administration and the Congress. 



o Having carried out the preceeding recommendation, the United 

 States should take the lead in consulting with prospective 

 partners to initiate a joint planning effort aimed at 

 large-scale collaboration . 



This joint planning activity would have to involve groups at the 

 program leadership level and at the technical leadership level, in 

 appropriate roles, and would have to be a continuing activity over 

 many years. Quite plainly, an opportunity is open for leadership of a 

 cooperative approach to a new technology of global significance. 



