747 



A different cechr.ique of one-shoe endownnen: for a "bi-nacional foundacio?." 



is also possible and has been e::iployed in cha pasc, notably in the case 



of Israel. Sach have cheir advantages and disadvantages. (The es tablish-ent 



of an Executive Office of the President fund is a logical possibility, 



but is neither realistic or desirable, and will not be considered further.) 



Relying on appropriated agency RiD funds has several problens: 

 establishing objective criteria for comparing the foreign policy interest 

 of alternative proposals, detenining the weight that should bf given to 

 those interests, providing adequate means for representing those interests 

 in the budget process, and absorbing the implicit reduction in funds 

 available for the domestic objectives of the agency (especially acute if 

 funds oust be segregated in advance to protect against later rejection). 

 The prograns, however, are more likely to be of high quality since the 

 technical people T.ost knowledgeable are those nost heavily involved, and 

 the scientific evaluation would be by the nornal process. 



Developing a separate line icetn budget within agencies administered 

 by the technical divisions or the international office (or both) avoids 

 the problem of reducing funds for "domestic" RiO objectives (assuming no 

 larger tradeoff), but raises more starkly the problem of justification 

 of funds and effective program evaluation. It can lead to continuation 

 of funding once started simply from the normal inertia of budgets, and 

 can reduce the pressure for scientific justification since the funds are 

 not subject to as rigorous competition. In addition, the international 

 offices, if they asminister the funds, may develop a vested interest in 

 the programs which may not adequately reflect either overall US foreign 

 policy interests or the scientific opportunities. Line items for programs 

 intended to serve, in part, foreign policy interests raise directly the 

 problem oi how funds and prograns are compared across agency lines, 

 especially since the normal budget process within agencies and with Che 

 Congress involves other considerations. 



On the other hand, both line items and use of regular R&D funds 

 give Che agencies a stake in international activities, force them to 

 have to evaluate, advocate and defend Che programs as their own, require 

 attention Co use of resources for incernacional purposes, and allow che 

 development of permanent staff commitment as opposed simply to carrying 

 out programs as a "service" to other agencies. 



The alternative of establishing funds in the Deparcttienc of Scate to 

 support international scientific and technological activities of the 

 agencies has several serious barriers, though it appears accraccive in 

 che abscract as a way of forcing projeccs co compece within a limited 

 fund. One barrier is simply the political reality of expecting State to 

 be able to obtain funds of any scale for this purpose. Another is the 

 separation of the source of funds from the scientific and technological 

 resources, coupled with State's inherent- difficulcy in identifying 

 adequately che opporcunicies in science and cechnology across che Government. 



