749 



T'nough all of che alcernacives have chcir screnschs and weaknesses, 

 ic seens inescapable diac :or che bulk of inc am?. clonal science and 

 technology accivicies justified in pare on foreign policy grounds, ir is 

 the resources of the agencies chexselves chat will have to be relied 

 upon. The other choices are simply not commensurate with the nature and 

 scale of the overall objective and vich likely growth in interest, 

 though all mechanises are, and ought to be, used to soir.e extant. 



That will r.oc be enough, however, for th^ need for planning flexibility, 

 especially for broad programs of cooperation of high political value and 

 i»'hite House interest, such as with China ind the Soviet Union, dictates 

 a requirement for some segregated funds able to be used for new international 

 initiatives. The amounts should be strictly limited on the assumption 

 that programs once established should move into a competitive process of 

 some kind as rapidly as possible. Under that assumption, the Department 

 of State could be che logical repository of such funds, but more realistically 

 they can reside within che N'SF, and/or as line items in the appropriate 

 domestic agency budgets. 



Process for managing agencv funds 



The conclusion chac che bulk of che resources must come from the 

 igencies, however, requires coming to grips with the difficulties 

 associated with chac route. Primarily, those difficulties have to do 

 \.-ich evaluation and choice when a foreign policy motivation is involved. 

 \^'ho is responsible and/or qualified to rapresent the foreign policy 

 interest? Kow much should it weigh against scientitic evaluation? How 

 can activities with different councries, diffcrenc fields, different 

 -.gencies be compared? U'hac can provide che discipline chat is required 

 CO force hard choices? How objeccive can foreign policy criceria be in 

 any case? 



An argumenc can be made that almost any S&T inceraccion wich a 

 councry of inceresc is "good." Tradicionally , che Deparcmenc of Scace 

 has cended to support fairly uncritically international SiT activities 

 of other agencies within broad foreign policy constraints. But that is 

 inadequate, if it ever was otherwise, in a period of growing interest in 

 more effective use of US S&T capacity internationally. Even if funding 

 constraints were not as serious as they are today, responsible use of 

 public funds and resources would require more appropriate discipline. 



In chinking abouc various alternative mechanisms, ic is important 

 to realite that the intarnacional accivicies ciiac are accually relevanc 

 CO chis analysis are only chose that fall marginally below che cutoff 

 point on an agency's ZB3 ranking. That is, proposals above che cutoff 

 will be funded whatever the foreign policy interest. Proposals that 

 fall near che boctom of the Z3B ranking are of little interest to the 

 agency and should proceed onlv if there is a special foreign policv 

 interest in having them implemented. In that case, external funding is 

 clearly appropriate and, in fact, essential. Only those below but near 

 che cucof: are of inceresc, for chey have reasonable scientific merit 

 and agency eng.Tgeaent. 



