750 



7~.Ls !:•£-; ls-5-s :; the foilowi-c irss.rla approach: The Derarrser.: 

 c: S:i:a cr-li. -- ^-e budget cycle, 2:t;=r: s raaking of incematisral 

 5i7 ;-;cr -i~g 3cr;ss csrarr^ears a»: ajsrcies ^cccrci-g re for:!^ prlicy 

 inzaresl. That raniiizg wculd be coe?arec with the i==e=e3=e=t rar.kir.g 

 vithia da?art=er.ts arsd agencies based o= aceacy criteria. Frcjects that 

 are sarcisal ca aa ageacy rarJ^ir.c. but high cr. fcreiga solitr raakir.c 

 vc-li be given an extra b?ost. Th.cse =argi=3l w-ithia the ageacy but Ic- 

 cn foreica policy venule be dropped, vhile those lev ia ageacy rar.iiiag, 

 ^_t high on foreiga policy vould proceed only vich fuacing provided by 

 :.-.e r^eoartaeat o: State or other exteraal source. Taose sarsiaal oa 

 i;t.-. scilss aig-: ces£-.s f.rther exaaiaatior.. 



S^cr. c prrcsss aay -ot re feasible for sll i=:2rr.;:tirr.3l SiT 

 3Cti\-ities. especially givea the sub:ectivity of foreiga policy criteria, 

 sad the staff tiae sad coepetaace t.->^t vo^ld be required of the r«part=eat 

 of State. Hovevar, as aa experi=eat. a selected list ef prograas 

 iceatified bv tha aser.cies that recuire soee foreiga policy evaluation 

 sr.d are problematic vithio sgaacy budgets, would produce a siaaageable 

 first list. Tr.era Jtay also be othsr vays of reduciag the task by 

 sajroliag or grouping of particular target couatries. cr deceatraliciajE 

 :-a process ia particular cases. Such a procedure would h-ave the virtue 

 o: requiring the Departasat of State to uacertake the very difficult 

 Zisk of davelopaeat of specific criteria taat caa be used for avsluatioa. 

 If successful, it would likely lead to upgradiag or dropping of soce 

 prograoLS that have siaply ccvastec for sons ys^rs. 



This process gives opportunity for c certain amount ot "gaairg ry 

 agencies as they anticipate which prograas will likely be given a rcrst 

 by State aad possibly adjusting their 04.-a rankings accordingly. To 

 liaic chat possibility, it vill be iarortant for C^2 tr bs tirect.y 

 iavalved. especially ia the exosrins-tsl r-ise. 



Tne "international prograa office of ascacies venule also h^ve to 

 be ia\-olvei. All too often these offices have inadequate expertise, fer- 

 ties tc the cecnnical divisions, and their =va vested iaterests ia the 

 exoaasiosi of in^teraatioaal prograa^ rather thaa ia critical evaluation 

 and suopcrr, Tbere is ao si=ple key to guarantee their effective cperatioa 

 since they suffer the saae str-uctural problsas within an ageacy en SiT 

 issues that State does with respect to the tec'anical agencies. Involving 

 :h«= directly in the dual raakiai process proposed, h^ove\-er, working 

 both with State am vit-~ their ov- teo.—.ical divisions, tar be a neans 

 of briagias aoct acre affective mtatration ano ef f erti. anass. 



Ia considering t.-;ese proposals, it should also ba noted that the 

 structure of CMS is itself relevant to their successful operation. I: 

 d,-a«stic prograa; funds, even under the restricted conditions posed, are 

 to "oe used wr.en programs are partially justified by foreiga policy 

 coasiceratioas, the docesric a»a interaacienal divisions of C^G becoae 



