751 



0M3 of Che process and how ic vill be ir.plenenced by the agencies and 

 chroughou: che budgec cycle, if i: is co have any chance of vorV-.ins. 

 CMS aiighc consider che sane cechniqua of cross-cuccing ranking, in che 

 final budgec process. 



Plannin:. Managemenc and Oversichc 



Whatever che funding ciechanisais used, Che need for adequace planning, 

 oanagemen: and oversight of incernational S&T activities is critical. 

 L'ncil recencly, che planning phase of incerr^acional activities, especially 

 chose origniacing fron scrong foreign policy mocivacion, tended to be 

 quice weak. Many agreeinencs and programs were undertaken wichouc 

 adequace advance choughc with resulcing serious problens of inplenencacion, 

 and ofcen raising questions about quality, objectives, and the possibility' 

 of "drain" of S&T inforaation. 



In the lasc two years, che need for a different approach has been 

 recognized, with detailed planning carried out under the leadership of 

 OST? and with che cooperation of OtlS as new agreements were concetTiplaced , 

 or e>:iscing ones reexamined. The sicuation is now strikingly improved, 

 as is evident in che Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican S&T agreemencs, and 

 in che reexamination of che agreemencs wich Che USSR. 



The need is not only for adequace planning when che President or 

 Secretary of State or other official se.2s a politically- juscified 

 requiremenc for an SaT agreement. The goal should also be co develop 

 opporcunicies in which science and technology can co-cribuce co the 

 foreign policy interests of che US. This is much harder to achieve, 

 since it involves greater sensi tivicicy chroughouc che Government to 

 those foreign policy incerescs and of how SiT programs can serve Chem. 



Subscancive management and oversighc, in turn, is obviously Important 

 for any program; ic can be more difficult for incernacional S&T accivities 

 Chan many, or ac least require some additional management devices, 

 because of che nulciagency involvemenc and che mix of disparate scientific 

 and foreign policy objectives. There is little need here to discuss the 

 details of alternative management and oversight devices. The CISET 

 Commictee of che FCCSET oughc Co be able Co escablish appropriace 

 process and procedures. Obviously, che activities should be managed 

 with the goal of maximizing both the scientific and policy returns. 

 Hopefully, these are fully congruent, so that the better a project on 

 technical grounds, the more likely it is to serve policy purposes.' 



In establishing a mechanism to provide oversight for international 

 SiT activities, it is important to keep in mind that the whole may be 

 greater than the sum of the individual programs. That is, even if the 

 ^scientific interest in a given accivicy -may not have been fully competitive 

 by itsolf, the sum of international S&T activities may offer considerable 

 long-ter:^ scientific interest to the US. The growing involvement, and 

 dependence, on global problems gives the US a considerable stake in 

 developing interest and capacity in research on those problems throughout 



