755 



The alternucive of separaco agency budgets has ics own picfalls 

 biiC, with cha exception of che quesclon of scacucory authoricy and 

 Congressional reaction, these are essentially r.anageaent questions. Is 

 it possible to design a structure and process chac would nuke this 

 alternative work while nininizing che very real inherent problens? 



Sone eieraents of a potentially satisfactory structure and process 

 can be suggested, though che details will require more discussion and 

 elaboration. It is proposed that an experinenc be conducted with a very 

 liniced nuir.ber of agencies and/or with stringent budgetary constraints, 

 to test che ideas and their acceptability. 



Separate agencv budgets; a possible process and an exserinent 



The problem in sone respects is easier Chan inplied by che discussion 

 above, for a substantial segment of developnent-relaced activities could 

 fall in categories that cause no or few special problecs. Sone programs 

 are of sufficienc interest to the US, or could be seen to be with 

 "encouragement," as to hold their own in the competition for "domescic" 

 resources. For example, research on fooc and mouth disease in Mexico is 

 also of clear interest to the US and could easily be justified from 

 regular budgets. An indicacion of Presidencial or White House encouragement 

 would likely lead to more proposed programs of this kind wichin regular 

 agency budgecs. 



Ac che ocher end of che spectrum are chose programs chac are of 

 inceresc Co US foreign assiscance agencies buc of very low interest to 

 the domestic agency in that field. Such programs would have to continue 

 to be supported from the budgets of the foreign assiscance agencies as 

 at present. 



In between are Chose accivicies chac cannoc be considered co be 

 clearly wichin missions defined purely donesclcally , and yec which are 

 of some inceresc Co domescic agencies, are relevanc Co che capabilctes 

 of che agencies, and are percinenc co imporcanc developmenc problems. 

 It is for these that a different process needs to be developed if the 

 resources of che domestic agencies are to be more extensively engaged. 

 (Or course, the statutory authority and Congressional approval for a 

 departure from present practices may noc be possible for some agencies; 

 that go/no. go quescion will be ignored for Che purposes of the discussion, 

 though it obviously may be a complete barrier in some cases.) 



The essential problems with separate agency budgets for development- 

 related SiT programs stem from the greater difficulty of management 

 control, including issues of program developmenc, evaluation, funding 

 cor.parison, implementation, and central oversight. UTiat is required is 

 a mechanism able to work across agencies for program development and 

 continued cognizance, and a budget process that forces rigorous evaluation 

 of programs, comparisons between them, and oversight as a whole. 



