795 



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account of the often mixed purposes (combining technological and development 

 assistance goals) of many possible programs. 



The implications of these institutional restraints go farthe"-. 

 Astonishingly, the U.S. has no governmental instrument for cooperation with 

 developing countries, or any countries for that matter, when the purposes of 

 that cooperation cannot be defined either as scientifically competitive with 

 domestic R&D, or as pure assistance for the poorest of countries. That is, in 

 the broad range of situations in which cooperation could serve important U.S. 

 purposes, but cannot be categorized as simple foreign aid or highest quality 

 science, there is no regular means for effecting that cooperation, or 

 providing the U.S. share of its funding. Thus, the U.S. finds itself 

 hamstrung in its capability to respond to those developing countries that have 

 "graduated" from the poorest status. These also happen to be those countries 

 with developing science/technology capability best able to make use of 

 cooperation with the U.S., with the greatest interest in substantive 

 cooperation (often without any transfer of dollars), and in the best position 

 to contribute not only to solving their own problems but also to assist in 

 attacking global problems. 



In fact, in recent years, rather substantial efforts at developing 

 bilateral science/technology cooperation with such countries have been 

 undertaken by the U.S. government. Those initiatives have had to be taken 

 primarily at the White House level directly, with substantial problems of 

 planning and follow-through because of the constraints enumerated above. And 

 now, it appears, with the likelihood of pulling back from at least some of the 

 bilateral agreements that have been negotiated. 



52-283 0-86-26 



