806 



-30- 



Many aspects of that institution would be novel, in particular the assigning 

 of some of the benefits of mining to developing countries. The detailed 

 questions of implementation would be left to the interim arrangements 

 following the completion of the treaty and ultimately to the new Authority. 

 Some serious disputes are inevitable, both with regard to the mining itself, 

 to the operation of the Authority, and with regard to the unprecedented 

 transfer of technology provisions of the draft treaty. 12 Certainly, if 

 there is no treaty, a variety of ocean issues -- navigation, fishing, oil 

 exploration, research, as well as mining, may become the source of serious 

 dispute. 



In space applications there may be controversy arising over geostationary 

 orbit allocations, but more likely will be controversy over the international 

 efforts to manage and control space technology systems such as Landsat. That 

 earth resource surveillance system has been until now an experimental American 

 monopoly, but as it moves to operational status many questions will become 

 more pressing. Who owns the information in a world in which sovereignty of 

 resources has been zealously asserted? What rights do nations have for 

 unilateral surveillance of another country's resources? What are the security 

 implications of the high resolution that will now be built into the system? 

 Should the output be available to anyone who asks for it? Who should manage 

 the system, and determine its technical characteristics? What are the 

 economic and political implications of greater knowledge of resource 



l^Law of the Sea draft treaty. United States Delegation Report, 

 "Resumed Ninth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 

 of the Sea," July 28 - August 29, 1980, Geneva. 



