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to the nation's (or the world's) security. Whatever the views of the causes 

 of the arms race between the Soviet Union and the U.S.. or the current state 

 of relations between the superpowers, the nature of new weapons systems often 

 has the effect of making the arms balance more precarious, more vulnerable to 

 preemptive action rather than contributing to stability. There is some reason 

 to think that will continue, and perhaps worsen, as capabilities are pursued 

 that threaten concealment of weapons systems, that give greater premium to 

 surprise, that make it harder to know whether missiles contain one or many 

 independent warheads. Developments in conventional weapons, moving rapidly, 

 may also change the nature of "local" war, leading to greater instability 

 among developing countries as one or another believes it has the capability 

 for rapid strike and victory. 



There are, of course, no simple and obvious alternative courses of 

 action. It is easy in rhetoric to call, for example, for more attention to 

 military and related systems that contribute to stability, and to shy away 

 from those that lead to greater uncertainty and threat: adequate conventional 

 ground forces; improved command, control, and communications in a hair-trigger 

 weapons environment; greater commitment to developing arms control agreements, 

 more attention to "hot-line" communication capability; less emphasis on 

 strategic weapons that pose a first-strike threat in favor of those with clear 

 survivability; and others. Each has its ambiguities, however, and there is no 

 agreement on what is required for security, or even for greater stability. 



The fact of the matter is that science and technology are most likely to 

 continue to alter military-related systems, and in ways that are not amenable 

 to certain anticipation of effects. One of the objectives of arms control 



