810 



■34- 



agreements is to bring 1:he situation under greater control; but even if one 

 were optimistic about SALT II and follow-ons, those agreements deal only with 

 existing or planned technology, not with the results of R&D that might 

 undermine the agreements through new weapons systems or related capabilities 

 not anticipated. 



What can be seen, however, is that the general level of analysis, of 

 knowledge of "threat systems," of involvement of the scientific and 

 technological community in strategic debates, of public perceptions of 

 military/strategic affairs, are all inadequate to the increasing importance of 

 the debates. The once substantial public role of scientists and engineers in 

 strategic policy deliberations, for example, has been greatly reduced, and 

 thus the public inputs to arms control and weapons debates have suffered. The 

 spectacle of the stagnation of the SALT II agreement in the U.S. Senate over . 

 essentially extraneous issues is a measure of the inadequacy of the framework 

 and understanding of the essential elements of strategic issues. 



Some argue that the whole framework of the strategic debate has been 

 rendered inadequate, in large measure through the products of the scientific 

 and technological enterprise.!* They go on to call for emergence of a new 

 paradign, a new "discipline" of conflict studies, and that the scientific 

 conmunity has a special responsibility to bring this about. The argument that 

 the arms race is seen in a wholly inadequate framework has considerable merit, 

 though the path for changing that situation is hard to discern in practical 

 terms . 



l^Boulding. 



