817 



international matters. At tne detailed level of decision-making -- budget 

 decisions within agencies, negotiations with the Congress or with 0MB, setting 

 the technical objectives of programs -- the traditional pressures dominate. 



As was described above, this situation affects the involvement of science 

 and technology with international matters in several specific and important 

 ways . 



One of the most significant has to do with developing countries where it 

 was noted that the national resources devoted to RAD on development problems 

 is pitifully small, and that the U.S. government lacks an effective instrument 

 for cooperating with that large number of increasingly important nations not 

 eligible for direct assistance (not poor enough), nor sufficiently 

 scientifically advanced to be competitive with domestic research. A new 

 institution (ISTC) was proposed in 1978, authorized in 1979 and ultimately 

 left unfunded by the Congress. Something to serve the same functions, 

 whatever the form, is required. 



But the problem is not simply a new institution. An important part of the 

 need is to tap more effectively the scientific and technological resources of 

 the U.S. Government housed in the functional departments and agencies, and to 

 enlist their R&D clients in the nation at large. A single, new small agency 

 cannot accomplish that task alone, though it could have provided the 

 leadership for much larger changes. 



Rather, a means must be found for allowing departments and agencies to 

 allocate resources directly for cooperation with other nations and to carry 

 out R4D on problems that are not "American" problems, when such activities are 

 in the national interest. At present, legal authorization or executive budget 



