policy IS still an issue. The effects of 

 scientific and technological develop- 

 ment and the many ways in which 

 applications of new technology are 

 altering international relationships 

 would seem self-evident. Even the 

 most casual observer would assume 

 that the dominant U.S. role in sci- 

 ence and technology would require 

 that these subjects and their implica- 

 tions be placed high on the agenda of 

 the department most concerned with 

 the nation's foreign policy. 



Even when specific issues become 

 politically visible and are placed high 

 on the department's agenda, all too 

 often the department is entirely and 

 uncritically dependent on technical 

 information from other agencies or 

 from outside the government — often 

 from interested parties. In less prom- 

 inent subjects the department effec- 

 tively leaves leadership to other 

 agencies, with a few notable excep- 

 tions, and often has difficulty main- 

 taining even a monitoring role. 



The department's ability to use the 

 great strength of the United States in 

 science and technology for foreign 

 policy purposes is limited indeed (a 

 situation that "passeth understand- 

 ing" in other countnes). Moreover, 

 the department's Bureau of Oceans 

 and International Environmental 

 and Scientific .'\ffairs, which has the 

 mandate to enhance the integration 

 of science and technology into the 

 foreign policy process, has little sta- 

 tus or political influence within the 

 department. 



We ought to be brutally realistic 

 about what changes are feasible now, 

 given the present department and 

 the constraints it faces. First-class 

 scientists and engineers will never 

 (and should never) be recruited for 

 careers in the Department of State in 

 substantial numbers. Political officer 

 postings abroad and similar posi- 

 tions in Washington will remain the 

 primary routes for career advance- 



ment. Personnel ceilings and budgets 

 for the depanment will continue to 

 be exceedingly tight, preventing sub- 

 stantial growth in new directions. 

 Not only science and technology but 

 many other specialized subjects, 

 such as trade, migration, human 

 nghts, and drug enforcement, will 

 strain the breadth of knowledge re- 

 quired of a regular U.S. foreign ser- 

 vice officer 



Can anything useful be done? Of 

 course, but expectations must be 

 modest. One necessary step would 

 be to seriously develop means, 

 whether it be courses, on-the-job 

 training, or something else, to sensi- 

 tize regular foreign service officers to 

 the implications of science and tech- 

 nology for their policy concerns and 

 teach them how to deal with them in 

 relation to their pnmary functions. A 

 second step of equal importance 

 would be to reserve the post of assis- 

 tant secretary for oceans and interna- 

 tional environmental and scientific 

 affairs for a highly respected career 

 foreign service officer This is not a 

 comment on the present incumbent, 

 a political appKjintee. Rather, it is a 

 recognition that in a career service 

 the fastest way to improve the pres- 

 tige of an office is to staff it with the 

 very best in that service, and to be 

 consistent in that policy. 



The Department of State, how- 

 ever, also needs quality help in deal- 

 ing with areas of science and 

 technology important to it. For that 

 it should turn to the private sector 

 much more than it now does or than 

 its insular culture encourages. It is 

 not difficult to enlist scientists and 

 engineers to help on specific issue 

 areas; the problem is more one of 

 having the internal capability to ask 

 for and use such help efficiently and 

 effectively. 



None of these measures, or others 

 that could be suggested, is a panacea. 

 The question is how to do better in 



an area of obvious and critical im- 

 portance—an area in which the 

 United States holds undisputed lead- 

 ership but for which the nation's for- 

 eign policy machinery too often 

 appears chaotic, ignorant, ham- 

 strung, or badly misguided. Secre- 

 tary Shultz, whose own varied career 

 must surely lead to solid understand- 

 ing of the need to integrate science 

 and technology into the foreign pol- 

 icy process, should be well equipped 

 to bring about some genuine change. 

 The verdict is not in, but the evi- 

 dence so far is not encouraging. ■ 



The author is professor of political 

 science and director of the Center for 

 International Studies at the Massa- 

 chusetts Institute of Technology. 



28 



ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



