832 



Scheinman REFLECTIONS ON PAST EXPERIENCE 



U.S.-OECD Cooper; 



TABLE II 

 : Energy R&D Programs in Late 1976 



Includes facility construction, energy use and conservation, energy systems analyses, and R&D strategy. 

 •"Umbrella agreement with Japan covering nine-nonnudear subjects is treated as one agreement. 

 "^The CCMS of NATO and the NEA of the OECD. 



for late 1976 with lEA substituting for multilateral 

 mechanisms, and Table HI displays for 1978 the 

 range of lEA cooperative programs and the extent of 

 national participation.^ 



II. SOME GENERIC OBSERVATIONS ON 

 INCENTIVES AND LIMITATIONS 



The purpose of this paper is to selectively examine 

 past experience in science and technology coopera- 

 tion with a view to identifying the key characteristics 

 accounting for successful and less successful ventures 

 that might be applicable to fusion R&D activities. A 

 number of enterprises are examined, among them 

 CERN; Euratom including JET; Urenco; the Nuclear 

 Energy Agency (NEA) projects, Halden, Dragon, and 

 Eurochemic; and INTELSAT. One caveat should be 

 stated at the outset: it is not the case, nor should it 

 be expected, that there is any generic model of co- 

 operation that can be simply applied to new ventures. 

 By the same token, past experiences carry limited and 

 selective lessons for shaping future enterprises. Suc- 

 cessful ventures are more likely to be those whose 

 organization and rules of the game have been tailored 

 to accommodate the objectives to be achieved, the 

 character of the participants, and the salient environ- 

 ing political factors. Before seeking to draw on par- 

 ticular past experiences, it would be useful to set 

 down some general observations about incentives and 

 limitations to international cooperation in research 

 and technology. The intention is to be representative 

 only, not exhaustive. 



II.A. Incentives 



The incentives to cooperate internationally on 

 science and technology matters are relatively straight- 

 forward and familiar and for the most part relevant to 



fusion. Several are ( 



-•rated here. 



l.Cost. R&D costs are very substantial, partic- 

 ularly in basic research and high technology. It is not 

 a question of whether a state can afford to under- 

 write the full costs of a particular R&D program, but 

 rather of the totality of costs that must be incurred 

 across the spectrum of desired R&D activity and the 

 impact of this on resource allocation. No state can 

 really afford the costs and associated economic dislo- 

 cations that would result from trying to develop the 

 full spectrum of potentially promising technologies, 

 and all states would inevitably have to make choices 

 among conflicting technological pathways with the 

 risk of sacrificing some attractive R&D strategies. 

 This is particularly pertinent in the present when con- 

 siderations of energy resource diversification and 

 increased self-sufficiency are high priority national 

 objectives, and emphasis is being given to exploring 

 a broad range of alternative sources of energy supply. 

 Other cost-related benefits include avoiding duplica- 

 tion of research efforts, potentially accelerating the 

 pace of technological development, and possibly 

 achieving earlier amelioration of the broader energy 

 problem, which carries the added benefit of removing 

 a potential source of interstate conflict. 



2. Concepts. No country has a monopoly on ideas 

 or scientific ingenuity. Cooperation arrangements are 

 perceived as a means of identifying and exploiting 

 new research approaches and enhancing national ef- 

 forts by increasing the technological base through the 

 interaction of technical manpower and expertise. 

 While this is an argument that could be applied in any 

 particular research sector, it has special bearing where 

 it is deemed desirable to pursue a broad range of 

 energy strategies and the relevant science and tech- 

 nology advantage is dispersed among a number of 

 countries. 



3. Political considerations. Advanced industrial 

 high technology states with a strong scientific base 



NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY/FUSION VOL. 2 JULY 1982 



