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Scheinman REFLECTIONS ON PAST EXPERIENCE 



may find economic and technical reasons to cooper- 

 ate less compelling than weaker and less-advanced 

 states. However, political considerations, such as en- 

 hancing national influence abroad or the pursuit of 

 particular foreign policy objectives (e.g., U.S. support 

 of European integration as a principal source of U.S. 

 cooperation with Euratom) may provide strong incen- 

 tives to enter into cooperative arrangements. Al- 

 though perhaps stimulated by political considerations, 

 successful implementation of R&D cooperation ulti- 

 mately depends on the fit of the participating states' 

 scientific and technical programs and the presence or 

 absence of legal or institutional impediments to fufill- 

 ment of the program's objectives. At the same time, 

 it is unlikely that a good programmatic fit will lead to 

 a productive operational outcome in the absence of a 

 strong political will to succeed. The case of Euratom 

 perhaps best illustrates this point. 



In light of who the past and probable participants 

 in fusion cooperation are (the United States the So- 

 viet Union, Japan, and western Europe) and the U.S. 

 objective to develop the highest potential of fusion 

 rather than to pursue exclusively the first fusion con- 

 cept to reach the energy breakeven milestone,* the 

 political considerations would appear to be less rele- 

 vant and the cost and concept considerations to be 

 more salient and considerably more persuasive in sup- 

 port of a cooperative strategy insofar as fusion co- 

 operation is concerned. 



II. B. Limitations 



There are problems in and limitations to interna- 

 tional cooperation, and the benefits are not cost free. 

 Frequently this is a consequence of the particular 

 features of the cooperative arrangements, such as the 

 character of the parties or the subject matter, the 

 origins of cooperation (e.g., political but lacking 

 scientific and/or technological compatibility), or the 

 organization itself. There are however some generic 

 characteristics that deserve mention. 



]. Basic versus applied R&D. Where the program 

 objectives are scientific development, and are still re- 

 mote from commercialization, cooperation tends to 

 be easier. The closer one comes to applied R&D, how- 

 ever, the closer one comes to economic interests that 

 have stakes in the results of research, and the more 

 difficult it becomes to achieve successful cooperation. 

 This is a reason why historically the technical projects 

 offered as the basis of international cooperation tend 

 to be projects of relatively low salience to the partici- 

 pants. Thus, Euratom was offered lead responsibility 

 in the development of organic-cooled reactors but not 

 in the development of breeders much in the same way 

 that Dragon, a technically interesting but commer- 



cially uncertain project, became one of the center- 

 pieces of Britain's contributions to the ENEA. In 

 short, national concern over the control of commer- 

 cially useful information serves as a restraint on the 

 scope of support for proceeding on the basis of inter- 

 national cooperation. But it does not foreclose it. 



2. Structural prohibitions. National policies and 

 laws regarding the protection or dissemination of in- 

 formation generated in research programs involving 

 government funding and participation differ, and in 

 the case of the United States are subject to publica- 

 tion and dissemination unless classified or somehow 

 privileged, as in the case of proprietary information. 

 The availability of such information under freedom 

 of information has two potentially inhibiting effects 

 on R&D cooperation. On the one hand, it creates the 

 possibility of access by potential R&D partners to 

 useful technical information without having to share 

 the costs incurred in producing the information in the 

 first place. On the other hand, the risk that informa- 

 tion generated at home will, upon transfer to a for- 

 eign jurisdiction with a liberal information policy 

 such as the United States, not be afforded adequate 

 protection can serve to inhibit the willingness of 

 others to cooperate with the United States. 



A related issue is patent policy, which also can 

 affect cooperative R&D. In some cases (e.g., France), 

 the government owns the patent on anything result- 

 ing from R&D involving government sponsorship and 

 participation. Firms pay the government a govern- 

 ment-determined royalty for use of the product and 

 also are subject to rules the government lays down 

 about where the product can be marketed. In other 

 cases (e.g., the United States), the information and 

 resulting patents derived from government-funded re- 

 search are available on a royalty-free basis and the law 

 precludes entering into agreements that effectively 

 divide up the market and dictate where companies 

 can or cannot operate. Under these circumstances, 

 cross-national cooperation can be impeded if not 

 foreclosed. Such a situation arose when the United 

 States entered into an agreement with France to test 

 a 1-MW U.S. -built solar-heated power plant boiler in 

 the French solar energy test facility at Odeillo. 

 French insistence on access to test data and on ex- 

 clusive marketing rights in Europe and Africa on any 

 patentable result nearly led to termination of the 

 cooperative agreement. While in that instance a 

 mutually acceptable agreement was reached (each 

 country to be responsible for the application of pat- 

 ents in its own country and both to consult on the 

 application in third countries), differences in patent 

 provisions, like information policies, can significantly 

 affect R&D cooperation. 



i. Juste retour. International cooperation can be 

 inhibited by the need to satisfy the political criterion 



NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGV/FUSION VOL 2 JULY 1982 



