837 



Scheii 



REFLECTIONS ON PAST EXPERJENCE 



no direct commercial value, and (c) it has the con- 

 tinuing and exclusive support of the founding govern- 

 ments with virtually no industrial involvement. Only 

 rarely, therefore, could CERN serve as a complete 

 model for international collaboration, although in 

 some senses fusion research comes closer than almost 

 any other energy-based joint program. 



Western European governments founded CERN at 

 the strong urging of the high energy physics commu- 

 nity, which emphasized that Europe could not catch 

 up with the scientific progress made m the United 

 States durmg the war unless the necessary resources 

 and equipment, which lay beyond the capacity of any 

 single European country, were developed. This under- 

 lying political concern helps to account for the initial 

 and continued positive responsiveness of the partici- 

 pating governments. 



A council of state representatives governs CERN. 

 This council determines the broad scientific and ad- 

 ministrative policies of the organization by simple 

 majority except for budget issues and staff appoint- 

 ments and dismissals, where a two-thirds majority is 

 required. Management of activities is supervised by a 

 director-general supported by four deputies responsi- 

 ble for different functional areas. With the exception 

 of some tensions over the siting of a second accelera- 

 tor in the late 1960s (possibly best explained by the 

 impact on the organization of extraneous political 

 tensions related to efforts to achieve European unity 

 and a resurgence of nationalism on the continent) and 

 occasional pressures from national industries seeking 

 bigger shares of large engineering contracts, CERN 

 has had a remarkably productive and uneventful exis- 

 tence. 



Among the lessons that can be drawn from the 

 CERN experience are the importance of strong and 

 sustained political commitment, the value of having 

 a clear and concisely defined set of objectives, and 

 relative ease of cooperation (which is nevertheless 

 significant and meaningful) where industrial and com- 

 mercial interest are not engaged. 



III.B. Euratom 



If Euratom shares with CERN the attribute of a 

 formal central institution for R&D-related decision- 

 making, it shares little else.*" In terms of political and 

 industrial-commercial considerations, political com- 

 mitment, and specificity and preciseness of objective, 

 the two organizations could not be further apart. This 

 is reflected in the distance between them insofar as 

 successful fulfillment of their mandates is concerned. 



Euratom had eminently political foundations. Al- 

 though functionally dedicated to the development of 

 nuclear energy, it was visualized by its main propo- 

 nents as a step in the construction of an integratecj 

 and united western Europe. As such, Euratom was a 

 means to an end as well as an end in itself. The fact 



that its objectives extended beyond scientific and 

 technological R&D, and included stimulating and 

 controlling nuclear industrial development under 

 supranational auspices, burdened Euratom with major 

 responsibilities that could have been successfully 

 carried out only if powerful political commitments 

 were present on a sustained basis. In fact, such 

 political will was lacking and the organization ful- 

 filled only a shadow of its original objectives. 



Political limitations were not the only difficulty 

 Euratom faced. Unlike CERN, which focused on non- 

 commercial R&D, Euratom was charged with an ex- 

 plicitly industrial task. It was not, however, vested 

 with the necessary industrial authority, such as an in- 

 dependent source of revenue to support development 

 strategies, or even the ability to participate in na- 

 tional industrial investment strategies in the nuclear 

 sector. This effectively foreclosed Euratom from the 

 commercially important activities and industrial de- 

 velopments that became the fulcrum of nuclear 

 energy development. Perhaps nowhere is this more 

 vividly demonstrated than in Euratom's inability to 

 mount effective community action in the field of fast 

 reactors. 



The community's own R&D program (funded in 

 two consecutive five-year programs of $215 and S425 

 million, respectively, and thereafter by annual alloca- 

 tions) was relegated to emphasizing projects of 

 limited national or industrial interest (e.g., the 

 organic-cooled heavy water reactor study, and longer 

 term studies such as fusion and high temperature 

 reactors). While Euratom lost, the national states did 

 not necessarily gain. Their industrial structures were 

 weakened by the resulting fragmentation. In 1968, 12 

 European firms were competing to build 16 nuclear 

 plants in a market the size of the United States where 

 one-third that number of firms were competing to 

 build five times as many reactors. 



A third problem that has plagued Euratom, but 

 is not peculiar to it, is the Juste retour mentioned 

 earlier. States contributing to common undertakings 

 that are largely implemented through contracts to 

 supporting industrial and research organizations are 

 sensitive to the distribution of these contracts. Per- 

 ceived inequities are not taken lightly and are often 

 responded to at the political level with pressures for 

 a more equitable distribution. One more extreme ex- 

 ample was the refusal of Italy to approve Euratom's 

 annual budget for any work unless assurances of a 

 more "equitable" distribution of common resources 

 were given. While participants do not insist on a 

 dollar-for-dollar settlement, disparities beyond 25 to 

 30% between contributions and 

 evoke sharp response. 



tend 



Euratom s experienc 



the field ol 



search is also instructive. The JHT. which WJ^ de- 

 signed by u team of European scientists on the basis 

 of Soviet tokamak lechnuloiiy 'at Britain's Culham 



NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY/FUSION VOL. 2 JULY 1982 



