842 



Scheinman REFLECTIONS ON PAST EXPERIENCE 



recognize the value of supporting fundamental R&D 

 in this way, the natural inclination of many is to seek 

 to preserve as much national control and exclusivity 

 as they can and to gain maximum national advantage 

 from what is achieved. The record of largely indepen- 

 dent determination of national scientific and techno- 

 logical research and development efforts in energy 

 and other matters confirms this. 



Many factors explain this disposition: a prefer- 

 ence for national managerial and decision-making 

 control; the preservation of proprietary and com- 

 mercial interests; the difficulties in negotiating 

 around legal and institutional conditions, which re- 

 flect cultural and structural differences among so- 

 cieties; the problems of ensuring that there is an 

 equitable sharing of benefit as well as risks; the strong 

 desire to avoid giving something for nothing; and the 

 difficulties of assessing the values to be assigned to 

 the intellectual and substantive factors that are ex- 



But the record also shows that cooperative ar- 

 rangements can be successfully negotiated and imple- 

 mented; that they can deal with high technology as 

 well as basic research, and with commercially proxi- 

 mate as well as commercially remote activities; that 

 while multilateral ventures tend to introduce a greater 

 set of complexities than do bilateral counterparts, 

 they can be as productive in terms of technical out- 

 comes and organizational durability. Or, to put it 

 another way, while bilateralism may simplify matters, 

 it does not ensure either technical or organizational 

 success. 



It also would appear, however, that the proximity 

 of a given scientific or technological activity to com- 

 mercialization does affect the probability of wide- 

 spread support for cooperative action; that while 

 multilateral fora are satisfactory means for coordinat- 

 ing general policies and programs, they are more 

 problematic as a basis for joint R&D projects; and 

 that a close alignment of national interests and an 

 ability to make roughly equivalent scientific and tech- 

 nological contributions to the common enterprise 

 probably is necessary if it is to proceed efficiently 

 and effectively. 



These general observations suggest the following 

 guidelines for entering into cooperative arrangements. 



1. Effective cooperation requires two basic ele- 

 ments: strong political will to enter and sustain co- 

 operation and a reasonable matching of skills and 

 interests of the cooperating partners. Both are neces- 

 sary; neither alone is sufficient. The larger the number 

 of participants, the more heterogenous the group and 

 the more difficult it becomes to meet these criteria. 

 Even in the face of political support and convergent 

 national interests, an ability to make roughly equiva- 

 lent financial and technological inputs is an essential 

 element. 



2. There should be an acknowledged leader or 

 authoritative manager. The lead country concept, 

 while not a panacea for cooperative organization, 

 does show a good record in comparison with arrange- 

 ments more closely approximating classic interna- 

 tional organizations. One reason may be its apparent 

 ability to minimize, if not avoid, the juste re tour 

 problem and to resist pressure for recruitment, pro- 

 curement, and resource allocation in some fixed pro- 

 portion to contribution. And this in turn may reflect 

 the fact that lead country approaches are volun- 

 taristic, ad hoc, and selective with respect to partici- 

 pants. 



3. The objectives of any cooperative arrangement 

 should be cleady defined at the outset, precise with 

 respect to the distribution of responsibilities and 

 means for dealing with conflicts that may arise, and 

 limited in scope. Open-ended arrangements have al- 

 most invariably run into serious difficulties while 

 more precisely defined and limited arrangements- 

 even one with as rocky a career as Concorde-tend to 

 survive. 



4. As projects come closer to potential commer- 

 cialization, i.e., as they move out of the basic science 

 phase, the relevant industrial actors should be brought 

 into the arrangement. Involvement at the basic plan- 

 ning stage is preferable to involvement only at the 

 point of implementation. To date, there are relatively 

 few examples of satisfactory resolution of ways to 

 effectively engage the private sector despite its being 

 essential when industrial applications begin to become 

 relevant. 



A number of years ago, a State Department task 

 force concerned with energy laid down the criteria 

 by which the potential benefits of cooperation, and 

 therefore the desirability of taking initiatives, could 

 be judged. They would appear to be as valid today as 

 they were in 1974: 



1 . the existence of unexploited opportunities 



2. the existence of useful technology abroad 



3. potential for reduction of the energy deficit 



4. reasonable time of transfer to commercial use 



5. lack of legal or proprietary barriers.' 



Leaving aside the question of transfer time to 

 commercial use, it would appear prima facie that 

 state-of-the-art fusion meets most reasonable interpre- 

 tations of these criteria. (I am interpreting potential 

 for reduction of the energy deficit through fusion in 

 the spirit of Walter Marshall's judgment: "The chance 

 of success is zero, but the promise is infinite.") 



The costs of fusion R&D are substantial, activity 

 is progressively entering the technological and engi- 

 neering phase of development, but numerous uncer- 

 tainties remain and critical path development is yet to 



NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY/FUSION VOL 2 JULY 1982 



