843 



Scheinman REFLECTIONS ON PAST EXPERIENCE 



be defined. This would seem to dictate enhanced in- 

 ternational cooperation among the four centers of 

 excellence in this field. Of what this next step in 

 cooperation should consist of is primarily a technical 

 issue, but to the nonexpert it would seem that, at a 

 minimum, a jomt planning strategy that identifies the 

 next set of major problems and parcels out the re- 

 sponsibilities even to the point of joint building of 

 prototype machines with full and complete exchange 

 of R&D results would be logical. Organizationally, 

 the JET experience highlights the problems associated 

 with commitment to a single machine, and tech- 

 nically that may be the wrong step to take at this 

 time. One of the worst conceivable outcomes, how- 

 ever, would be for the fusion programs to fall into the 

 "fast reactor syndrome" that characterized western 

 Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s in which all 

 of the principal countries involved in breeder reactor 

 R&D pursued the same costly development strategy, 

 building the same machines separately. 



A final observation lelates not to the desirability 

 of cooperation but to the attractiveness of the United 

 States as a cooperating partner. On the one side, we 

 have the advantage of intellectual, managerial, and 

 economic resources and the reputation as a world 

 leader in science and technology. On the other side, 

 there are the patent, licensing, and information rules 

 of the game discussed earlier but also, and more im- 

 portantly, an uncertainty about the United States as a 

 reliable partner. This is not a problem endemic to 

 science and technology cooperation and in fact is 

 more evident in other branches of activity-soybean 

 exports in the early 1970s, and nuclear export and 

 cooperation policy in the late 1 970s for example. But 

 recently reliability once again became an issue in 

 R&D cooperation in the form of whether to proceed 

 with the trilateral SRC-Il project. The project was 

 eventually cancelled. 



Consequently, other nations cannot but wonder 

 whether cooperation with the United States might 

 not entail risks and costs that exceed any benefit that 

 might ensue. The United States is not the only coun- 

 try afflicted with this problem. Three times during 

 the Concorde project the British sought to withdraw. 

 Twice the French prevailed on them not to, the third 

 time entrenched domestic interests prevented a de- 

 cision of withdrawal. The project was completed and 

 subsequent joint efforts have been entered into. Can 

 the United States live up to that standard? If not, can 

 it hope to remain a central actor In International 

 science and technology cooperation? 



REFERENCES 



HERMAN POLLACK and MICHAEL B. CONGDON," 

 lernational Cooperalion in Energy Research and Develop- 

 nl .•■ Law and Policy in Inl. Business. 6, 677 ( 1 974). 



2. ROBERT KEOHANE, "The International Energy Agency: 

 State Influence and Transgovernmental Politics," Int. Organ., 

 32, 4, 944 (Autumn 1978). 



3 DAVIS B. BOBROWand ROBERT T. KUDRLE, "Energy 

 R&D: In Tepid Pursuit of Collective Goods," Int. Organ.. 33, 



2, 153, 162, and 166 (Spring 1979). 



4. JOHN F. CLARKE, "The Next Step in Fusion: What It Is, 

 and How It Is Being Taken," Science. 210, 4473, 967 (Nov. 28, 

 1980). 



5. WARREN B. WALSH, Science and International Public 

 Affairs. The Maxv^ell School, Syracuse, New York (1967). 



6. LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, "Euratom: Nuclear Integra- 

 tion in Europe," Int. Conciliation, 536 (1967). 



7. HENRY R. NAU, National Politics and International 

 Technology: Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe. 

 John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland (1974). 



8. JOHN GRAY et al.. International Cooperation on Breedei 

 Reactors, Rockefeller Foundation (May 1978). 



9. Committee on International Relations, Science. Tech- 

 nology, and American Diplomacy. Vol. I, p. 239, U.S. Con 

 gress(1977). 



10. JOHN RUGGIE, "Collective Goods and Future Interna 

 tional Collaboration," Am. Political Science Rev.. 66, i, 87^ 

 (Sep. 1972). 



1 1 . HENRY R. NAU, "Collective Responses to R&D Prob 

 lems in Western Europe: 1955-1958 and 1968-1973," Int. 

 Organ.. 29, .?, 617 (Summer 1975). 



12. HENRY R. NAU and JAMES P. LESTER, "Technological 

 Cooperation and the Nation-State," paper presented at 1980 

 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 

 Washington, D. C. (unpublished). 



13. STEVEN A. LEVY, "INTELSAT: Technology Politics, 

 and the Transformation of a Regime," Int. Organ.. 29, i, 655 

 (Summer 1975): 



14. EUGENE SKOLNIKOFF, "Relevance of INTELSAT Ex- 

 perience for Organizational Structure of Multinational Nuclear 

 Fuel Facilities." International .Arrangements for Nuclear Fuel 

 Reprocessing, A. CHAYES and W. B. LEWIS, Eds., BaUinger 

 Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1977). 



15. CON ALLDAY, "Some Experiences in Formation and 

 Operation of Multinational Uranium-Enrichment and Fuel- 

 Preprocessing Organizations," International Arrangements for 

 Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing. A. CHAYES and W. B. LEWIS. 

 Eds., Ballinger Press, Cambridge. Massachusetts (1977). 



Id. CON ALLDAY, "International Cooperation in the Supply 

 of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services," paper presented at Inlerna- 

 tional Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, Salz- 

 burg. Austria, May 1979. 



NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY/FUSION VOL 2 JULY 1982 



547 



