848 



90 R'Himv W- Mc/'oh 



Although the industrialized countries were at lirst reluctant to plan another UN 

 conference, no one doubted the need for raising quality and efficiency in the UN itself 

 concerning the uses of science and technology in development. Furthermore, most 

 LDCs— often speaking through the surprisingly effective caucus of nations called the 

 "Group of 77" — pressed their case for more favorable economic terms in building 

 their technological base for industriali/.ation. 



In 1974-75 when North-South tensions peaked, some DCs were hoping that plans 

 for the UNCSTD would "de-politicize" part of the contentious debates by 

 separating certain science and technology issues from the rest of the UN's economic 

 forums. But many LDCs had the opposite objective: to link .science and technology 

 issues more closely with negotiations for a "new international economic order."' 

 Thus, with only a partial recognition of the incompatible goals and a full diplomatic 

 acknowledgement of everyone's high hopes, it was at^reed by consensus in 1976 to 

 go ahead with UNCSl D.' 



Secretar\' General and Secretariat 



The appointment of Joao Franck da Costa, a career diplomat from Brazil, as 

 Secretary-General for UNCSTD was made in January 1977. He and his associates in 

 the Conference's Secretariat got off to a shaky start Although he had been virtually 

 the unanimous choice of all who had been planning the conference, da Costa 

 surprised everyone by getting involved almost immediately in debilitating disputes 

 within the UN bureaucracy. Thus, despite his considerable personal qualifications 

 and his strong background in the conceptual evolution of UNCSTD. cooperation 

 within the UN itself during the preparatory process has been le.ss effective than had 

 been hoped. 



By the end of 1978, after two years of being buffeted by the almost countless diplo- 

 matic cross currents that affect organization of a world conference, the Secretary- 

 General and his small, able staff were still troubled by external and internal con- 

 straints. The problems of the preparatory process have made leadership exceedingly 

 difficult. As we shall see in a moment, an encouraging sign, as 1979 began, was the 

 Secretariat's compilation of National Papers and the subsequent synthesis of 

 documents for discussion at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee in 

 January February 1979. Unfortunately, that Third Ses.sion was totally unproductive 

 becau.se the Group of 77. sensing the importance of the final stage of preparations, 

 could not agree on its substantive strategy and forced a delay of serious negotiations 

 until May. 



Af^enda, Guidelines. National Papers 



The official Guitlelines for preparing National I'apers were completed in early 1977.^ 

 They have been widely ignored. The inherent coinplexitv of responding to the 

 deceptively simple Agenda (see Figure 2) was made more opaque by the tortuous UN 

 syntax of the Guidelines. That the Guidelines were the product of lengthy 

 negotiations between contending factions from Ntirth and South may be a 

 foreshadowing of technical and political conflict at Vienna. 



