857 



For Want of a NaiP 99 



Remarkably, during 1978. the Group of 77 shifted its position, recognizing that 

 such lists should he^in with specific national \e\e\ obstacles rather than with vaguely 

 defined and usually provocative international issues. In the past, international 

 obstacles were always listed at the top, the implication being that external forces 

 (even the elements of "aid" itself) were the primary cause of underdevelopment. 

 This ensured that North-South negotiations would be less manageable and more 

 unfriendly. However, many observers in DCs are still concerned that the negative 

 motif of obstacles cannot encompass more positive, broader considerations such as 

 the need to provide stable policies fostering long range incentives for technology. 



Prospects for Paralysis 



To understand the practical prospects for the Conference, it is necessary to first be 

 clear about a number of longstanding operational problems that have paralyzed— or, 

 at the least, inhibited — the ability of national and international institutions to take 

 successful actions. 



One problem is that, in most DCs, little internationally oriented research is done 

 and what little there is has been an "orphan.'"^" it is an orphan because using 

 technology to aid the developing areas has not been a primary goal of any govern- 

 ment in the advanced countries or <A any major part of their private sectors. 

 Furthermore, the degree of international pertinence of national scientific and 

 technological activities is hard to define. This topic has received almost nc? systematic 

 national study. There has been even less international coordination, with science and 

 technology policy analysis being managed at low levels of both funding and political 

 attention.^' 



When spokespersons for the Group of 77 insisted on trying to get more quanti 

 tative delineation of what LDC-related research is going on. they were making a 

 reasonable request. Although many delegates from DCs argued convincingly ihat a 

 great deal of internationally pertinent results flow from R&D which is funded mainly 

 to serve the DCs" national purposes (e.g., health, weather, oceans, space), that 

 argument cannot be repeated much longer unless it is given greater specificity. 



A related problem in charting meaningful action is that spec\i\c techmcal priorities 

 have been hard to set. We might consider four options for setting priorities." The 

 formal agenda for UNCSTD ducks the priority setting problem altogether by lieing 

 broadly exhortative (see Figure 2); this option is useful perhaps for popularization, 

 but not for policy analysis and action. A second approach, often taken by 

 development-oriented techncx rats (in the best sense), is to group the many goals of 

 LDCs into clusters that are large enough to elicit international political interest and 

 homogeneous enough to evoke scientific attention; Figure 6 is one such useful 

 grouping. A third option is to let everyone vote — all member governments of the 

 UN, that is. When such an attempt was made recently, we got the "illustrative 

 subject areas" shown in Figure 7; this may be better than having no priorities, but 

 not much. Fourth, many critics of UNCSTD have chimed in with their viexvs on 

 what is important; the questions in Figure 8 typify such perspecti\'es, which are 

 usually full of conflicts. With this welter of ideas, who will set priorities, and how ? 



