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NICHOLS: FOREIGN POLICY 197 



need for its potential action is rising. Gravely disabling political and 

 economic pressures often diminish the U.N.'s once-honored professional- 

 ism. Not least in the preparations for the Conference on Science and 

 Technology for Development (held in Vienna during August 1979) we 

 have seen how inter-agency squabbles and vague agendas can erode 

 much of the base for seriously focussed international action. 



Illustrative Five-Year Priorities: 

 What is S&T in (for) Foreign Policy? 



It might be stimulating to assess a few hypothetical priorities for a five- 

 year program spanning the roles of science and technology in (and for) 

 foreign policy. Let us take five areas for a brief review. 



The mission-oriented govenvnenta! agencies of the OECD countries 

 possess ample justification for renewed emphasis on R&D. Along with a 

 good case for a clearer definition of the R&D mission of each agency, 

 there also is an increasingly strong argument for explicitly adding inter- 

 national technical activity. For example, since the U.S. and NATO must 

 depend more heavily upon R&D as a hedge in arms control policies, 

 there is great justification for cooperating actively on more R&D— ^serv- 

 ing goals in arms control, intelligence, communications, and all stages of 

 weapons development. 



Some observers argue that the U.S. National Science Foundation 

 should reemphasize its traditional priority on basic research in agricul- 

 ture, reproductive biology, tropical diseases, energy, and other areas; 

 such work would help the U.S. and other countries. 



In the State Department, as another example, there is cogent justifica- 

 tion for more research on many of the policy-problems mentioned 

 earlier. 



Overall, most agencies need modest additional funding (even very 

 small sums would go a long way) to support international exchanges, 

 seminars, and short collaborative visits linking scientists from various 

 countries. 



We have listed a series of possible increases in support and so we must 

 consider loJ^at might be cut among the existing agencies. For example, 

 parts of the more conventional "technical assistance" programs of agen- 

 cies such as AID could be trimmed — if there were simultaneously a re- 

 orientation toward genuinely collaborative work, building up the capa- 

 bilities in LDCs that can enable them to carry out more self-reliant 

 choice-making about technology. Another area that might be cut is the 

 stage of defense R&D that is intermediate between research and produc- 



