881 



the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these 

 technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably 

 eroded. In fact, they do not have a choice, because they 

 will never be able entirely to block the tide of technologi- 

 cal advance. 



The revolution in global communication thus forces all 

 nations to reconsider traditional ways of thinking about 

 national sovereignty. We are reminded anew of the 

 world's interdependence, and we are reminded as well 

 that only a worid of spreading freedom is compatible with 

 human and technological progress. 



The Evolution of Strategic Defense. Another striking 

 example of the impact of scientific and technological 

 change is the issue of strategic defense. Here the great 

 challenge to us is not simply to achieve scientific and 

 engineering breakthroughs. As real a difficulty is to come 

 to grips with "our ways of thinking" about strategic mat- 

 ters in the face of technical change. 



For decades, standard strategic doctrine in the West has 

 ultimately relied on the balance of terror — the confronta- 

 tion of offensive arsenals by which the two sides threaten 

 each other with mass extermination. Deterrence has 

 worked under these conditions and»WE should not abandon 

 what works until we know that something better is 

 genuinely available. Nevertheless, for political, strategic, 

 and even moral reasons, we owe it to ourselves and to 

 future generations to explore the new possibilities that 

 offer hope for strategic defense that could minimize the 

 dangers and destructiveness of nuclear war. If such tech- 

 nologies can be discovered, and the promise is certainly 

 there, then we will be in a position to do better than the 

 conventional wisdom which holds that our defense strate- 

 gy must rely on solely offensive threats and must leave our 

 people and our military capability unprotected against 

 attack. 



Adapting our ways of thinking is never an easy process. 

 The vehemence of some of the criticism of the President's 

 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDl) seems to come less 

 from the debate over technical feasibility — which future 

 research will settle one way or another in an objective 

 manner — than from the passionate defense of orthodox 

 doctrine in the face of changing strategic realities. 



We are proceeding with SDI research because we see a 

 positive, and indeed revolutionary potential: Defensive 

 measures may become available that could tender obso- 

 lete the threat of an offensive first strike. A new strategic 

 equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply 

 reduced offensive deployments is likely to be the most 

 stable and secure arrangement of all. 



SCIENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 



These are but two examples of how technological ad- 

 vances affect our foreign policy . There are many others. It 

 is in our national interest, for example, to help other 



countries achieve the kinds of technological progress that 

 hold such promise for improving the quality of life for all 

 the world's people. The expansion of the global economy 

 and new possibilities of international cooperation are 

 among the benefits that lie ahead of us as technical skills 

 grow around the world. 



Therefore, cooperation in the fields of science and 

 technology plays an increasing role in our relations with a 

 range of countries. We have important cooperative links 

 with China and India, for example, as well as with many 

 other nations in the developing worid. 



We are working with nations in Asia, Latin America, 

 and Africa to achieve breakthroughs in dryland agricul- 

 ture and livestock production to help ease food shortages, 

 and in medicine and public health to combat the scourge of 

 disease. Our scientific relations with the industrialized 

 nations of Western Europe and Japan aim at breaking 

 down barriers to the transfer of technological know-how. 



Clearly, our science and technology relationships with 

 other industrialized nations are not without problems. 

 There is, in fact, a permanent tension between our desire 

 to share technological advances and our equally strong 

 desire to see American products compete effectively in the 

 international market. We cannot resolve this dilemma, 

 nor should we. The interplay between the advancement of 

 knowledge and competition is productive. Some nations 

 may focus their efforts too heavily on competition at the 

 expense of the spread of knowledge that can benefit every- 

 one, and certainly we in the United States should not be 

 alone in supporting basic scientific research. The in- 

 dustrialized nations should work together to strike a bal- 

 ance that can promote the essential sharing of scientific 

 advances and at the same time stimulate the competitive 

 spirit which itself makes such an important contribution to 

 technological progress. 



The interplay between the 

 advancement of knowledge 

 and competition is 

 productive. 



TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 



A further dilemma arises where new technologies may 

 have military applications. We maintain a science and 

 technology relationship with the Soviet Union, for in- 

 stance, even though we must work to ensure that the 

 technologies we share with the Soviets cannot be used to 

 threaten Western security. 



The innovations of high technology are obviously a 

 boon to all nations that put them to productive use for the 



14 THE BRIDGE 



