924 



39 



would appear to be marginal to the interests of both the U.S. govern- 

 ment and academic community. 



Part of the reason for this low level of interest and involvement 

 is that, unlike most of the other major elements of the UNESCO program, 

 which are mostly disciplinary-based, there is only a very limited con- 

 stituency for this activity. The subject is of some general interest 

 to governments of developing countries and to the limited academic 

 community concerned either with the planning of science and technology 

 (S&T) policy or with the impact of S&T on society and particularly on 

 economic development. For this reason, the United States derives 

 little direct advantage from participation, except to the extent that 

 it finds it useful to promote better S&T planning and application in 

 the Third World. 



The science, technology, and society program was among the earliest 

 initiated by UNESCO, and it is closely associated with those Americans 

 who were involved in the creation of the UN organization at the end of 

 World War II. More recently, the science policy development theme has 

 been criticized as too theoretical and not applied enough to the needs 

 of the Third World. There is also some competition between UNESCO's 

 science policy effort and the work of other multilateral bodies such 

 as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 

 Committee for Science and Technology Policy. 



Because the work undertaken within this program is comparatively 

 marginal to U.S. interests, there will be few substantial negative 

 consequences from withdrawal. One negative outcome may be the loss 

 of cross-national knowledge about the science policies of other 

 governments outside the OECD framework. Moreover, to the extent that 

 the United States wishes to influence other governments to adopt its 

 approaches to the development of S&T infrastructure and science policy, 

 an avenue of contact would be closed off. 



As a nation at the leading edge of S&T innovation, the United States 

 is at least as concerned about the impact of science =»nd technology on 

 society as any other developed country. To the extent that this concern 

 involves the need to enter into global dialogue with other technologi- 

 cally advanced countries and concerned developing countries, the U.S. 

 withdrawal would deprive this country of one of the international 

 forums available for analysis and discussion of these matters. 



Although the Science, Technology, and Society program is of rela- 

 tively minor consequence in comparison with other UNESCO activities, 

 there are both symbolic and functional benefits to be derived by the 

 United States from remaining a part of this program. At the symbolic 

 level, there is the fact that the United States has had a historical 

 commitment to the activity since the earliest days of UNESCO. More- 

 over, improving the S&T capabilities of developing countries has been 

 (and remains) a primary development goal of the current administration. 

 A U.S. withdrawal, if uncompensated with other initiatives, could appear 

 to send a mixed message to developing country governments. 



The other symbolic value of continuing support for this program has 

 to do with its potential foreign policy benefits. UNESCO offers an 

 opportunity to interact with scientists from countries where contacts 

 with the West are limited only to official channels, and where informal 



