1048 



38 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION 



OECD countries. Some OECD countries, in addition, are not in the 

 front rank scientifically, so that cooperation with them must be justi- 

 fied, if at all, on foreign policy as well as scientific grounds. 



The question here is not whether, but how to use science and tech- 

 nology in support of international goals. Clearly, international activi- 

 ties in science and technology can serve a variety of objectives in addi- 

 tion to R&D goals, including contributing to U.S. political and 

 economic interests with other countries, attracting high-level atten- 

 tion to particular issues, creating advantages for American industry in 

 foreign countries, gaining knowledge of scientific and technological 

 progress in other countries, and stimulating work on common or 

 global problems. Presidents, secretaries of state, and others have capi- 

 talized on the nation's strength in science and technology for coopera- 

 tion designed to achieve more than scientific purposes and will con- 

 tinue to want to do so. That is appropriate, for national goals can be 

 served by sensible use of all resources, as long as it is done responsibly 

 and without damage to the primary mission of those resources. 



The most difficult of the issues raised in these cases in the policy 

 process, and the ones that are at the heart of the problems of manage- 

 ment of international science and technology activities, are those asso- 

 ciated with funding. They are central to the goal of responsible man- 

 agement and deployment of public funds, and central to the ability of 

 the government to use its scientific and technological resources effec- 

 tively for a variety of national objectives. 



The major problem is that the international programs referred to 

 here cannot be fully competitive on scientific grounds with alternative 

 domestic programs (if they were they would raise no special concep- 

 tual problems, as programs in the first category), and even when they 

 may eventually be able to be competitive, the advance planning and 

 commitment process required to initiate a formal international or bi- 

 lateral agreement is not compatible with the normal competitive 

 budget process. Alternative budgetary processes and in some cases 

 segregated funding are thus unavoidable. 



There are several alternative budgetary mechanisms possible, none 

 of them fully satisfactory nor mutually exclusive. They include: fund- 

 ing of international activities from regular appropriated R&D funds; 

 developing line items within domestic agencies administered either by 

 a technical division or by an international programs office; seeking 

 dedicated funds in the Department of State to be transferred to the 

 operating agencies to fund these activities; seeking dedicated funds in 

 another agency, such as the NSF, for transfer as appropriate; or creat- 

 ing a new agency expressly for this task. A different technique of one- 



