THEORT OF LANDSCAPE DESIGN 



cuss now, however, as far as is necessary for our purpose. These 

 principles are fundamentally the same as those of design in all the fine 

 arts, but they differ in application just as landscape architecture dif- 

 fers from the other fine arts, in that they are applied to the particular 

 materials or elements of design with which landscape architecture deals : 

 namely, ground forms, vegetation, and structures in their relation to 

 landscape. 



In esthetic design, the fundamental thing which the artist is trying Psychological 

 to produce is an effect of pleasure in the mind of the beholder. All his £j/^"^,^/ 

 modifications of the form, color, and texture of his work are only means Theory of 

 to the end of this mental effect. Plainly, then, the principles of such Design 

 design must be the principles of the production of effects on the mind by 

 external objects ; in other words the principles are certain principles 

 of human psychology. From a consideration of these principles, there- 

 fore, we should be able to see more clearly by what mental processes 

 pleasure arises from external objects, and what characteristics of the 

 objects cause the pleasure. We should thus be able to go more directly 

 to work to bring about pleasure by proper use and modification of the 

 characteristics of the objects in our designs. 



In landscape architecture we are concerned almost exclusively with 

 those effects which are made on the mind through our sense of sight, and 

 indirectly through its cooperating sense, touch, including feelings of 

 muscular activity, which does so much to interpret our visual impres- 

 sions. The sensations received through taste, smell, and hearing, 

 though also to be considered, are not often so important in landscape 

 design. 



Our senses, acted upon by the world about us, give us various sen- Sensation, 

 sations. From these sensations we come to be able, by experience and ^^^'^^^"°"' 

 habit, to perceive the existence of objects in the world, and to attribute Intellection 

 to them the characteristics which our senses discover to us ; and also, 

 building from our memories of real objects, we may imagine objects 

 which have their characteristics related differently from any which we 

 have actually known. We may then proceed to think about these 

 objects, real or imagined, and about their relations in the world, and 

 to come to conclusions as to their usefulness, or whatever else about them 

 we wish to consider. These three processes, by which we gain all our 



