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individual transferable harvest privileges (such as Individual Transferable Quotas, or 

 ITQs) offers the potential for directly addressing three major causes of overfishing: 

 unlimited access to fish and the race for fish, lack of incentives for fishers to engage 

 in behavior conducive to the long term health of the fishery, and decreased 

 profitability resulting in economic pressure for increased harvests. 



Under an individual quota management system, as under any workable 

 management approach, the first step is to set a TAC level. This level must be 

 conservatively low to account for scientific uncertainty, natural variation, and the 

 ecological effects of harvest. ITQ management in New Zealand failed to prevent 

 the decimation of orange roughy, a newly discovered stock, because TAC levels were 

 set high despite a near total lack of understanding of the orange roughy's population 

 dynamics. Any management scheme is bound to fail if TAC is set too high. 



Next, portions of the TAC are allocated to fishers as individual quotas that add 

 up to the TAC, based on some equitable distribution formula. Quotas should 

 represent proportions of TAC rather than fixed tonnages of fish, to facilitate 

 adjustment of TAC in response to conservation needs. Formulas based on equal 

 shares, vessel harvesting capacity, catch history, or some combination of factors have 

 been used in the past. Another approach would be to allocate equal "lifeline" quota 

 shares (the minimum share of TAC required for an individual to make a living in the 

 fishery) to aU legitimate participants, regardless of size or historic catch levels. 



Overcapitalization and excessive numbers of fishers can be reduced if the 

 quotas can be traded; fishers can choose to sell their quota to other quota holders. 

 Furthermore, restrictions on the tradability of quota may increase incentives to cheat 

 by preventing highliners (fishers who are especially effective) from accumulating quota 

 in the market. This may have contributed to the failure of the Bay of Fundy herring 

 quota program. 



Individual Quotas may have to be reduced or revoked to reduce capitalization 

 or rebuild depleted populations. Costly government buyouts of quota can be avoided 

 by defining quotas as privileges to harvest a proportion of the TAC, rather than a 

 right. Early indications from US ITQ programs are that quota holders perceive a 

 strong interest in the long-term health of their fishery, even though their quotas can 

 clearly be reduced or revoked. 



Individual Transferable Quota management may facilitate comanagement of 

 fisheries (i.e., management by consensus and sharing of authority with stakeholders) 

 and increase cooperation. Conventional fisheries management systems do not appear 

 to be structured for effective decision making about harvest levels. Polarization often 

 occurs between managers/scientists with a stake in the long term sustainability of the 

 fishery and fishers who lack such a stake, resulting in political bargaining over TAC 

 levels and allocation of fish. This becomes an even more serious concern with the 

 implementation of ITQ management, because the TAC is the basis for determining 

 the value of harvest allowances defined by individual quotas. 



ITQ management has the potential for reducing polarization between managers 

 and fishers by increasing the stake of fishers in the long-term health of the fishery. 

 Limited experience with ITQ management does not allow firm conclusions, but there 



