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are some indications that opposition to reductions in TAC levels to rebuild or protect 

 populations in the face of scientific uncertainty is reduced when fishers hold quota. 

 ITQ management of depressed Southern Bluefin Tuna populations in Australia 

 facilitated a 30% cut in TAC (recovery of these populations has been slow due to 

 the long life span of the tuna). Vesting in the future by US wreckfish and shellfish 

 quota holders is indicated by the fact that quota share prices are much higher than 

 annual lease prices in these ITQ programs. Previous to ITQ implementation, 

 wreckfish fishers argued for increased TAC despite considerable uncertainty about 

 stock population dynamics. After quotas were allocated, the TAC for wreckfish was 

 cut in half without significant opposition. 



Quota management addresses some of the factors that cause overcapitalization 

 and the race for fish, but it does not address others, including: subsidies (such as dock 

 facilities and tax incentives), the desire to own the best equipment, and the race to 

 increase catches in anticipation of ITQ management so as to increase quota share. 

 These factors need to be addressed through legislative and regulatory changes in 

 conjunction with ITQ management if overcapitalization and the race for fish are to 

 be eliminated. 



Problems with ITQs 



While ITQ management appears to have real economic and conservation 

 advantages over open access or limited access with input controls, it has some 

 disadvantages as well. Fishers in rural communities with less access to capital rely on 

 hard work, skill, location, and other advantages to profitably harvest fish. They are 

 likely to have smaller catches than others, which puts them at a disadvantage if quotas 

 are allocated in whole or in part on the basis of catch history. 



Quota management would require fishers who do not receive quota initially to 

 buy into the fishery; only highly motivated fishers would be able to participate. The 

 cumulative impact of numerous individual sales of quota by fishers in a community 

 could virtually eliminate fishing as an important activity in the community, completely 

 changing its character, unless mechanisms are in place to prevent this. However, 

 quota holders would not be forced to sell quota, and communities interested in 

 retaining a fishing industry could advocate the allocation of quota to the community 

 or make other arrangements with quota holders. Community Development Quotas 

 would be allocated in the proposed ITQ plan for North Pacific sablefish and halibut 

 to address these concerns. 



ITQs appear to increase incentives for highgrading, if, on balance, incentives 

 for highgrading, including such things as the price differential for different grades of 

 fish, are sufficient. Costs incurred by highgrading, such as lost time and additional 

 labor costs, may in some cases offset incentives for highgrading. Fish mortality due 

 to bycatch and highgrading must be reduced and counted against TAC in conjunction 

 with ITQ management. 



ITQ management has the potential to address the fundamental causes of 

 overfishing: the race for fish, the lack of incentives for conservation, and the presence 

 of incentives for overfishing. Some fisheries will probably not be amenable to ITQ 

 management, and improvements in ITQ program design are clearly needed. However, 



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