Gentleman, if you would be kind enough to come up to the des- 

 ignated seat at the witness table, we will get started. 



Mrs. Unsoeld. [Presiding.] We will take the witnesses in the 

 order in which they are shown on the agenda. 



So, Mr. Matlock, that makes you first. 



STATEMENT OF GARY MATLOCK, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICER, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINIS- 

 TRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 



Dr. Matlock. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman. 



I am Gary Matlock, the Program Management Officer for the Na- 

 tional Marine Fisheries Service in the National Oceanic and At- 

 mospheric Administration. I am pleased to have the opportunity to 

 testify before the Committee on the state of the current U.S. -Can- 

 ada Pacific salmon negotiations. 



The Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC), established in 1985 under 

 the U.S. -Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty, has maintained extensive 

 salmon management programs. However, for the first time since its 

 inception, almost all PSC salmon management regimes expired at 

 the end of 1993, and have not yet been renegotiated. Thus, a brief 

 review of the issues involved may be useful. 



The basic principles of the Treaty set forth in Article III call for 

 the United States and Canada to work together to prevent 

 overfishing and provide for optimum production, and to provide for 

 each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salm- 

 on originating in its waters. The former is referred to as the "con- 

 servation principle" and the latter as the "equity principle". 



The PSC is unique in that Federal law dictates that decisions 

 can be taken only when there is no dissenting vote by the U.S. 

 Commissioners from Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, and Treaty In- 

 dian tribes. The Federal Commissioner has no vote and can there- 

 fore only play a conciliatory role. 



A very extended effort has been expended to date in negotiations 

 to again achieve long-term management regimes for 1994 and be- 

 yond. Unfortunately, the PSC did not reach any agreement on 

 salmon fishing regimes at its annual meeting in Vancouver, British 

 Columbia, in February of this year. The current task is complicated 

 by the number of issues requiring resolution simultaneously, Cana- 

 dian insistence that an understanding on "equity issues" be a pre- 

 requisite for any agreement on future fisheries management re- 

 gimes, and markedly different salmon stock conditions in various 

 areas. 



There is also a Canadian perception that the United States re- 

 ceives substantially greater benefits from salmon interceptions 

 than Canada does under the Treaty. The two sides have held a 

 number of meetings on the equity issue. They have exchanged pa- 

 pers outlining views as to the framework within which the equity 

 issues should be addressed. However, little common ground for 

 agreement has emerged. The Canadian approach envisions a nar- 

 row focus on calculating interceptions and developing a simplistic 

 "yardstick" using commercial fish prices to value benefits; whereas, 

 the United States takes the view that addressing benefits must en- 

 compass a much broader range of societal impacts, including rec- 

 reational and other uses of salmon. In addition, the United States 



