a little bit of historic background and a little bit of institutional 

 memory of where we were then and where we are now. I have a 

 statement which is submitted for the record. I would ask that my 

 complete statement be entered in the record. 



Mrs. Unsoeld. Without objection for all the witnesses. 



Mr. Derwinski. And I will just cover very briefly, and then make 

 some additional comment. 



I would like to point out something which I am sure everyone 

 can understand, and that is that achieving the Treaty and the sub- 

 sequent legislation was an extremely difficult challenge, by the 

 very delicate nature of — I don't want to say adversaries — the var- 

 ious points of view that existed. But the United States and Canada 

 started with a fundamental mutuality of interest. 



Obviously, though, their views, official views on conservation, 

 and management, were impacted by regional considerations. And 

 that is very understandable. And in the 15-year period preceding 

 the approval of this Treaty, the fishermen on both sides of the bor- 

 der suffered as stocks declined, allocations were distorted, and en- 

 hancement and research were limited. So it was in everybody's in- 

 terest that a treaty finally be reached. 



The fundamental problem which couldn't be addressed at that 

 time was that the United States and Canada have never agreed on 

 an interpretation of equity, nor on the system of accounting for 

 interceptions. This is reflected in the tortured language of the Trea- 

 ty and the accompanying memorandum of understanding. 



Had the Canadian position, which they repeatedly have stated 

 and have been very persistent and consistent in their statements, 

 been reflected in the language of the Treaty and the memorandum, 

 we would never have accepted them. The Senate would never have 

 ratified the Treaty. And we understood that and the economic cost 

 to the fisheries-dependent communities in the State of Washington, 

 and the State of Alaska would have been far too great. 



That was a factor in both the language that we had to struggle 

 with as well as the decisions that were made. Now, in the 10 years 

 that have past, the Treaty served a constructive purpose, and there 

 was a rational relationship in those years. I understand that the 

 United States and Canada have attempted to renegotiate the salm- 

 on management regimes, but obviously have not been successful. 



I also understand, and this is almost history repeating itself, that 

 the Prime Minister of Canada and President Clinton in a phone 

 conversation in April of this year discussed, among other things, 

 the need to solve the problems posed in the Pacific salmon issues. 

 The reason it sounds so familiar is that our effort which we under- 

 took 10 years ago started after a phone conversation between then 

 Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan. 



So here we are 10 years later at the level of the President and 

 Prime Minister, hoping to stimulate what would be a successful 

 new treaty. The issue, as I see it — here, again, I am looking at this 

 from a standpoint of history and reality more than with a political 

 hat. I am not a fishing expert, but I am convinced that the only 

 way that we in the United States could get ourselves positioned to 

 effectively negotiate with our Canadian friends and neighbors is if 

 we have a — what I call a domestic consensus. That means between 

 the fishing interests of Oregon, Washington and Alaska. 



