14 



This leads me to your question about obstacles to achieving a 

 unified position. We fail to reach a unified position because we 

 have conflicting interests and disagree on the specific meaning of 

 some rather fundamental elements of the Treaty. The most serious 

 substantive element is the principle of equity, the international al- 

 location standard of the Treaty. While none of us on the United 

 States side buys into the Canadian view, we have been unable to 

 move forward on this issue in the United States section because of 

 our inability to resolve our conflicting internal views. 



That we would disagree on important issues in the United States 

 section was anticipated in 1985. What was unanticipated was the 

 gridlock that would result from our lack of mechanism to resolve 

 our disagreements. We did not foresee an enormous capacity to 

 sustain debates over these issues, debates that lead to no resolu- 

 tion. In short, the requirement for total consensus among the three 

 voting U.S. commissioners has turned the requirement for total 

 consensus into a recipe for avoiding decisions, rather than a mecha- 

 nism for forcing consensus. 



What I find particularly ironic about this situation is that we, 

 the tribes and the States, created this system quite intentionally. 

 Each of us was so concerned about being outvoted by the others 

 that we wrote the consensus standard into the Treaty. Because of 

 our respective experiences with the Federal Government, we in- 

 sisted upon retaining local control over the decisions. 



That is why the Federal Commissioner was given no vote. We 

 knew that the consensus requirement would be a tough standard, 

 and that it would take a great deal of effort and a willingness to 

 compromise. What we failed to adequately foresee was the extent 

 of the gridlock that would result. Quite frankly, some of us did not 

 foresee how much the gridlock would serve to preserve the status 

 quo, a status quo which increasingly is more harmful to some of 

 us than to others. 



As I mentioned earlier, the tribes have good reason to be very 

 skeptical about surrendering any of their control over decisions 

 that so greatly affect them. However, we also recognize that there 

 is no value in protecting our standing in a salmon management 

 process which stands by and allows salmon to disappear. It sad- 

 dens us deeply to watch this precious and unique resource which 

 our people have nurtured and honored for thousands of years, dis- 

 appear in a few short decades. Something has to be done, now. 



The good news is the Treaty itself is basically sound. Even the 

 Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, our U.S. implementing legislation, is ba- 

 sically sound. That part isn't broke, so let's not try to fix it. 



There is one small exception. There needs to be a way to force 

 decisions within the U.S. section. Toward that end, I am providing 

 you with a proposed amendment to the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act 

 of 1985. This proposal is quite simple and preserves the oppor- 

 tunity of the tribes and the States to reach consensus. 



However, in the event they fail to reach a decision, the Federal 

 commissioner would have to propose a position to the three voting 

 U.S. commissioners. This Federal proposal, which would have to re- 

 spect both the international and domestic obligations of the United 

 States, could be modified by the State and tribal commissioners 

 only to the extent the three of them can reach agreement to do so. 



