58 



It is entirely appropriate and Important, however, that the United States periodically review its 

 parUcipaUon in the treaty with the objective of making that participaUon as effective and efficient as 

 possible. 



What are some of the obstacles which on occasion prevent the United States Section of the 

 Commission from reaching a unified negoUaUng position? Obstacles which hinder and, on some 

 occasions, prevent the United States SecUon from reaching an agreed negotiaUng position can be 

 categorized as "fundamental" and "procedural" factors. 



One example of a fundamental obstacle is when state and/or tribal interests compete directly for 

 harvest of a salmon stock or group of stocks such as chinook or Fraser sockeye salmon. This 

 represents a classical resource "allocaUon" problem. In the Unites States Section, competing users are 

 required to reach a consensus sharing arrangement. (Within each voting unit, there are also often 

 numerous competing interests which delays decisions on an individual vote.) 



Another example of a fundamental obstacle which sometimes hinders reaching agreed United States 

 negotiaUng positions in a timely manner is the differences in regional management approaches. For 

 example, "weak stock" management approaches sometimes used in Pacific Northwest fisheries differ 

 from general mixed stock management approaches employed in Canada and Alaska. In the case of 

 Chinook salmon, the United States Section has made progress in developing compromise 

 management approaches. 



A more complex fundamental problem, of an indirect nature, also exists. Canada frequently employs 

 a negotiating sti^ategy of attempting to leverage one United States interest against another. For 

 example Canada may withhold concessions to Pacific Northwest fisheries in an attempt to obtain 

 concessions in totally unrelated fisheries in Soutiieast Alaska. This artificially generates indirect 

 competing interests within the United States Section and impedes timely decisions. 



A procedural obstacle which sometimes hinders timely achievement of an agreed United States 

 negotiating position is the consensus requirement for the three voting United States Commissioners 

 representing Wash./Oregon, Alaska, and the Tribes. The form of the United States decision process 

 was essential to obtaining regional support for the Treaty in 1985. While considerable time may be 

 required in some cases to arrive at compromise solutions, tiie consensus process best protects regional 

 interests while maximizing collective United States interests. It also helps ensure that decisions 

 affecting regional fisheries and salmon management programs are made by regional "experts" most 

 familiar with Uiose programs. 



Another procedural obstacle is an informal requirement sometimes invoked that all elements of a 

 U.S. negotiating position must be agreed to before a U.S. position can be forwarded to Canada. This 

 can result in disagreements on a relatively minor issue delaying agreement on a total U.S. position. 



