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That we would disagree on important issues in the United States SectioQ was 

 anticipated in 1985. What was unanticipated was the gridlock that would result from otir 

 lack of a mechanism to resolve our disagreements. We did not foresee our enormous 

 capacity to sustain debates over these issues, debates that lead to no resolution. In short, 

 the requirement for total consensus among the three voting U.S. Commissioners has turned 

 out to be the recipe for avoiding decisions, rather than a mechanism for forcing consensus. 



What I find particularly ironic about this situatioa is that we •- the tribes and the states 

 - created this system quite intentionally. Each of us was so concerned about being out- 

 voted by the others that we wrote the consensus standard into the Treaty Act. And, 

 because of our respective experiences with the federal government, we msisted upon 

 retaining local control over the decisions. That is why the Federal Commissioner was given 

 no vote. We knew that the consensus requirement would be a tough standard, and that it 

 would take a great deal of effort and a willingness to compromise. What we failed to 

 adequately foresee was the extent of the gridlock that would result. And, quite frankly, 

 some of us did not foresee how much that gridlock would serve to preserve the status quo, 

 a status quo which increasingly Ls more harmful to some of us than to others. 



As I mentioned earlier, the tribes have good reasons to be very skeptical about 

 surrendering any of their control over decisions that so greatly affect them. Ho\vever, we 

 also recognize that there is no value in protecting our standing in a salmon management 

 process which stands by and allows the salmon to disappear. It saddens us deeply to watch 

 this precious and unique resource, which our people have nurtured and honored for 

 thousands of years, disappear in a few shon decades. Something has to be done. now. 



Specific ^''''OT'rnendations to improve decision making, and the federal role 



The good news is that the Treaty itself is basically sound. Even the Pacific Salmon 

 Treaty Act, our U.S. implementing legislation, is basically sound. "If it ain't broke, don't fix 

 it" applies to most of the Act, with one small exception: there needs to be a way to force 

 decisions within the U.S. Section. Toward that end, I am providing you with a proposed 

 amendment to the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 (16 USC 3631). This proposal is 

 quite simple, and preserves the opportunity of the tribes and states to reach consensus. 

 However, in the event they fail to reach a decision, the federal Commissioner would have 

 to propose a position to the three voting U.S. Commissioners. This federal proposal, which 

 would have to respect both the international and domestic obligations of the United States, 

 could be modified by the state and tribal Commissioners only to the extent the three of 

 them can reach agreement to do so. This amendment would result in something happening 

 that many of us thought would occur with the existing system: the federal Commissioner 

 wotild taJce on an influential role in facilitating decisions. This is the most important role 

 the federal government can play in the United States Section's debTserative processes, and 

 stands in sharp contrast to the wholly unacceptable alternative of allowing the federal 

 government to unilaterally negotiate on our behalf. 



We believe this simple proposal is all that must be done to end the decision gridlock. 

 However, I want to reiterate an earlier point I made: restoring the salmon resource will 

 require much more than improving the function of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This 

 amendment is, however, an important and very good start. 

 Thank you. 



Testimony of Gerald I. Jaines, Tribal PSC Commissioner 

 Page 3 of 4 



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