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Lack of progress on these basic issues has contributed to the failure to pursue 

 opportunities to increase production to the benefit of interests in both countries. 



We have an opportunity to move forward, building upon the govemment-to-government 

 discussions this summer. We must aggressively pursue that opportunity through a clear 

 commitment at both the federal and regional levels. 



We believe that instituting the Pacific Salmon Treaty was fundamental to the long-term 

 success of our efforts to rebuild and enhance salmon resources in the Pacific Northwest. 

 After almost ten years of experience under the Treaty, we believe that it is time for a 

 renewal of the original commitments and for fundamental changes to ensure the 

 potential in the Treaty is realized by both countries. Our problem is not with the 

 concepts embodied in the Treaty. It is with the failure to follow through on the 

 initiatives embodied in the original Treaty and its annexes. 



Pacific salmon generally migrate northward upon entering the ocean. As a result, 

 salmon runs from Washington, particularly stocks of coho and chinook, are intercepted 

 in fisheries off of British Columbia and runs from British Columbia are taken in mixed 

 stock fisheries off of Southeast Alaska. Canadian fisheries take relatively few fish 

 originating in Alaska. This basic pattern puts Washington at a geographic disadvantage. 



A basic Canadian strategy up to and after agreement on the treaty has been to use its 

 fisheries off of the west coast of Vancouver Island as the principal avenue to address its 

 concerns about interception levels in the Fraser River sockeye fishery and in southeast 

 Alaska. It became apparent that each country was capable of frustrating the 

 conservation goals of the other, and that neither country could manage its fisheries 

 without the cooperation of the other. 



A number of factors led to the signing of the treaty in 1985. There was clear recognition 

 by the parties of the need for coordinated management given the migratory patterns of 

 stocks from both countries and the traditional fisheries that have developed on the 

 resulting mixtures of stocks. There were more specific concerns as well, principal among 

 them being the mutual recognition that chinook stocks from both countries were 

 declining and in need of coordinated management action. 



The U.S. also raised concerns regarding the escalation of coho catches in southern 

 Canadian fisheries at the same time southern U.S. fisheries were increasingly restricted 

 in order to meet basic conservation concerns. Tagging data indicated that these southern 

 Canadian fisheries had significant impacts on U.S. stocks. 



Long-standing commercial fisheries have developed in both countries dependent upon 

 the Fraser River runs of sockeye and pink salmon. Both countries were looking for 

 improvements to the management regime then in place under the International Pacific 



Robert Turner 



