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Salmon Commission. In the north, both countries had a need for improved coordination 

 of southeast Alaskan and northern British Columbia mixed-stock fisheries. 



The rationale for and the promise of the Pacific Salmon Treaty was clearly stated by 

 Secretary of State Schultz in the letter transmitting the 1985 agreement to the President: 



Pacific salmon is one of the most valued resources of the Northwest, prized by 



fishermen of both countries. Effective salmon management requires international 

 cooperation Conservation of salmon resources requires coordination among all 

 management regimes which affect stocks throughout their migratory range. Both 

 Parties must share responsibility for the development and preservation of the salmon 

 stocks, which often are subject to harvest by fishermen of both Parties as these stocks 



migrate between the ocean and freshwater spawning grounds. This treaty, the 



culmination of these long negotiations, provides a workable means to manage, 

 conserve and rebuild the resource. 



The treaty signed in 1985 contained general principles agreed to by the parties, 

 established the Commission and provided guidance as to its operation and established 

 initial management objectives and guidelines. Secretary of State Schultz described these 

 principles as follows: 



Two main principles govern the treaty. As set out in Article 111(1), they are first, to 

 "prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production, " and second, to "provide for 

 each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its 

 waters. " This second principle, the so-called equity principle, is intended to provide 

 for each Party to receive compensation benefits of unspecified form or quantity for 

 fish harvested by the other Party. This will be no simple task. We anticipate that this 

 calculation will consider, among other factors, numbers offish that are intercepted, 

 their size and growth potential, and their value. To the extent that the Commission is 

 able to ascertain that the levels of interception by each Party are not equivalent, it 

 would be expected that within the Commission the Parties would develop a phased 

 program to adjust and compensate for the inequity. 



Both Parties came out of the treaty discussions in 1985 with significant expectations that 

 long-standing problems and issues would be dealt with constructively through the 

 Commission. An ambitious annual meeting cycle was initiated, designed to deal with 

 both short-term and long-term aspects of salmon management. 



Many of the measures called for in the 1985 treaty annexes were intended as initial 

 steps. The chinook rebuilding regime is a prime example. Specific management 

 measures, for example the ceilings on mixed stock fisheries, recommended in the annex 

 to the 1985 treaty were based upon very limited information. It was our expectation that 

 as additional information became available, the regime would be quickly improved in 



Robert Turner 



