87 



The bilateral Coho Stock Composition Workgroup under the Pacific Salmon Commission 

 i.isued a long-awaited report' in February that estimates the average proportion ot' 

 Washington-bound coho stocks in the Canadian WCVI fishery between 1984 and 1991 to 

 be more than b6% - reaching as high as 86.5^c in 1985 and 76% in 1989! This information 

 further substantiates what we said in 1993 - the Treaty's original harvest ceiling of 1.8 

 million coho in this fishery is simply and structurally too high to be sustained. 



The region's efforts to rebuild chinook stocks listed under the Endangered Species Act also 

 justifies our objective. Canadian harvests have differential impacts on a wide variety of 

 Washington chinook stocks. Regardless of ESA implications, rebuilding chinook stocks will 

 require continued actions to reduce harvest rates in fisheries north of Washington. 



WASHINGTON'S NEGOTIATING POLICY 



Last year, for the first time since the Treaty was signed, I emphasized that Washington state 

 would distinguish between "preferred" negotiating strategies and "viable" negotiating strategies 

 developed to achieve our objective. Preferred strategies are those that cost Washington interests 

 nothing. Viable strategies are those that reaiistically might achieve our objective. 



I continue to strongly believe that we must focus on viable strategies and not waste time and 

 energy developing "preferred" strategies that only will result in the status quo. 



All viable negotiating strategies will require the U.S. agreement to provisions Canada 

 perceives beneficial in exchange for its concessions. 



THE CONSERVATION PRINCIPLE 



For a number of years, the U.S. has attempted to appeal to a conservation ethic within 

 Canada and the con.servation principle within the Treaty. Our argument has been that 

 because both countries depend on each other's salmon production, we have a mutual interest 

 in protecting and sustaining that production at the highest level possible. Fisheries should be 

 managed in accordance with the escapement objectives of the stocks contributing to them. 

 We have repeatedly cited our cooperative management of Fraser River sockeye harvest as 

 an example of this ethic. 



Canada takes the view that this approach ignores the Treaty's principle of equity -- that each 

 country should receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon from its waters. 

 While Canadian stocks intercepted by the U.S. have been at relatively high levels in recent 

 years, many U.S. stocks intercepted by Canada are at depres.sed levels. Under the Canadian 

 view, the practical reality of the U.S. scenario leads to U.S. interceptions in both Alaska and 



