125 



achieving agreed U.S. positions on a range of issues derived from an 

 orientation by non-Alaskan parties to trade away Alaskan interests in 

 order to achieve their objectives. This attempt to link unrelated fisheries 

 to the benefit of southern U.S. interests and the detriment of Alaskan 

 interests represents an explicit abrogation of an agreement not to trade 

 across fisheries boundaries which had existed in the U.S. section since the 

 conclusion of the Treaty agreement in 1985. 



The conscious decision to advocate such linking played directly into 

 Canadian hands in terms of dividing U.S. interests north and south. It also 

 fostered Canadian expectations that they would be successful in extorting 

 concessions in Alaskan fisheries. It should be clear that if such an attempt 

 at extortion were to succeed, it should be anticipated that the U.S will see 

 that approach as a continuing strategy from Canada. Canada has a 

 demonstrated willingness to behave outside the bounds of conservation 

 needs in order to attempt to achieve other political and fisheries 

 objectives. Our recommendation for being able to achieve U.S. agreed 

 positions is that we return to the longstanding policy of not trading across 

 fishery regions on unrelated fisheries. This would reduce or eliminate 

 Canada's expectation that they might succeed by abusing conservation 

 situations. More broadly, the U.S. should take the position that northern 

 and southern issues will be negotiated independently as was the case in 

 achieving the 1985 Treaty. 



In terms of fisheries issues, this return to a division of negotiations in the 

 north and south, whether formal or informal, represents an approach that 

 will be advantageous to the U.S. and ultimately to Canada. It is the most 

 efficient and mutually advantageous route to achieving consensus within 

 the U.S. delegation. For chinook salmon, there is clearly a need to continue 

 northern and southern dialogue in order to achieve rehabilitation, 

 rebuilding, and reasonable harvest balances of the chinook resource. 



On issues not directly effecting specific fisheries, such as equity, it must be 

 recognized that the U.S. had an agreed position as recently as 1993. That 

 position rejected the simplistic and biased position espoused by Canada as 

 unrealistic in terms of national interests and unrealistic in terms of the 

 behavior of the salmon stocks. The U.S. alternative had suggested not 

 attempting to quantify superficially national interests, but to focus 

 realistically on increasing the benefits of both nations through joint actions. 

 That position we feel was sound, and suggest that it again form the 

 foundation for a U.S. approach to the topic of equity. That position was 

 abandoned unilaterally by the southern U.S. under increased ideological 

 rhetoric from Canada and shameless threats by Canada to abuse the 



8 



