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conservation crisis in southern waters involving ESA-listed chinook and El 

 Nino impacted coho salmon. The Canadian "logic" was that if they can't 

 catch as many U.S. spawned fish in the south, then Alaska must reduce in 

 the north. 



To repeat, equity should not be construed as a simplistic balancing of 

 interceptions. It assuredly is not equitable to restrict Alaskan fisheries 

 due to independent production difficulties in southern regions. In terms of 

 U.S. positions on this pivotal issue, the most reasonable approach is to 

 return to our previously agreed position as the starting point for further 

 discussions. On this topic as well, however, differing U.S. perspectives, 

 north and south, argue for handling this issue separately in the respective 

 regions. In either case, a coherent negotiating position hinges on 

 eliminating the orientation to appeasing Canadian pressures at the expense 

 of a single element within the U.S. 



4. How might the Federal government contribute 

 constructively to the negotiating process? Should the 



federal government have the authority to negotiate 

 unilaterally, or to encourage the States and Tribes to reach 

 a unified position? 



In my view, the federal initiative this past year to attempt to deal with 

 parts of the Pacific Salmon Treaty were wholly counter-productive. It 

 created an atmosphere for Canada to pursue unrealistic expectations 

 associated with a government-to-government resolution of the issues. 

 They developed a strident strategy of aggressive fishery stances, and an 

 unacceptable equity position. They also stated that significant progress had 

 to be made on equity (e.g. capitulation by the U.S. to the Canadian position) 

 before they would cooperate on U.S. conservation concerns. Canada was 

 attempting to achieve at the level of governments what they could not 

 possibly achieve on the merits of their arguments within the Pacific 

 Salmon Conmiission. 



The most constructive act possible within the Treaty would entail the 

 federal government removing itself from its perceived "new" role in the 

 process, and returning the issues to the Pacific Salmon Commission forum 

 where they appropriately belong. For people who do not recall the history 

 of the achievement of statehood by Alaska, one of the primary driving 

 forces behind that effort was the failure of the federal government to 

 maintain the salmon resources in the Alaskan territory. Salmon were 

 depressed to unacceptable levels as a consequence of federal actions. 



