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regarding conservation. In particular, it should help separate Endangered 

 Species Act considerations and the Pacific Salmon Commission issues, both 

 internally and with respect to closing an opportunity perceived by Canada 

 to divide U.S. interests north and south. It should also reinforce with the 

 government of Canada a North-South separation in the Commission 

 negotiations for 1994/95. In general, the federal government should take 

 the necessary policy actions which make clear to Canada that they can 

 achieve satisfactory salmon arrangements only within the Treaty, that 

 greater success is not available through political maneuvering at the level 

 of governments. Canada's expectations now must be reduced to accepting 

 again that those salmon issues will be resolved only in the forum 

 established by the Treaty which brings together the greatest professional 

 knowledge and expertise on the subjects and is sufficiently buffered from 

 politically motivated interference. 



To conclude, much has been made erroneously about the Treaty process having 

 disintegrated. Rather, although slow in some instances, this Treaty and its 

 Commission generally have been successful over a broad range of issues. Separable 

 circumstances, such as ESA concerns, and a breakdown of patience and discipline by 

 some within the U.S. delegation should not be permitted to undermine the system. 

 That system has worked well in general and can be anticipated to continue serving a 

 productive function as long as every discomfort encountered in the process is not 

 allowed to trigger a superficial review for restructuring. Stability in the Pacific 

 Salmon Treaty is now its most serious requirement for success. 



Thank you for the opportunity to provide some of my views on the topic before your 

 committees. 



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