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that Canada remains obligated by the conservation principle of the Treaty to curtail 

 interceptions of weak U.S. salmon stocks. At length, a final U.S. proposal for the 1994 

 season to address the immediate management challenges has been rejected by Canada. 



In charting the course for the future, the Administration and the Congress should 

 consider carefully, not only the text of the Treaty and its accompanying Memorandum of 

 Understanding ("MOU"), but also the official interpretation by the United States of those 

 instruments. The interpretation is found principally in the "Letter of Submittal" of the 

 Treaty to the President from the Secretary of State, as incorporated in the "Message fi^om 

 the President" to the Senate transmitting the Treaty for advice and consent. The United 

 States interpretation is also found in testimony presented by the Administration to the 

 House and Senate. 



It was on the basis of this interpretation, of course, that the Senate gave its advice 

 and consent, and the President ratified, the Treaty, and it was on this basis that the House 

 and Senate approved, and the President signed, the implementing legislation. The 

 provisions of the Treaty and MOU, as well as the interpretative statements, reflect the 

 complexities of the issues and, more importantly, the foundation upon which the United 

 States may and ought to assert its position in defense of its important conservation and 

 economic interests in the affected fisheries. 



A flirther issue is presented by the allocation among United States fishermen of 

 that portion of the harvest made available to them pursuant to the Treaty, the MOU, and 

 the implementing legislation. In addressing this issue, the Administration and Congress 

 should be sensitive to the clear understandings of the affected parties throughout the 

 negotiations and in the years following In this statement, I shall recount for the record 

 the nature of those understandings. 



